A/HRC/34/39 and the unilateral takeover of large swaths of West Bank land reserves, in violation of international law. 11. The settler population in Area C and East Jerusalem has doubled since the Oslo Accords, reaching over 594,000 people (including an estimated 208,000 in East Jerusalem) by the end of 2015 20 living in some 130 settlements and 100 outposts. That number is expected to rise further given the advancement of new construction in settlements. The existence of Israeli settlements and the designation of land for exclusive Israeli use have resulted in the gradual fragmentation of the West Bank, demographic changes and the illegal exploitation of natural resources, while restricting Palestinians’ access and denying possibilities for Palestinian development. 12. In July 2016, the Middle East Quartet questioned the long-term intentions of Israel given its continued efforts to exert control over the West Bank. 21 The Quartet cited the Israeli policy of settlement construction and expansion, designating land for exclusive Israeli use and denying Palestinian development as key elements in the steady erosion of the viability of the two-State solution, which undermines hopes for peace. 13. The policies and practices of Israel detailed in the sections below raise serious concerns. The impact of the Government’s settlement policy on the human rights situation of Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has been devastating, as highlighted by the significant developments that occurred during the period under review. A. Designation of land for exclusive Israeli use 14. Since Israel began its occupation of the Palestinian territory in 1967, a central feature of its settlement policy in the West Bank has been the gradual takeover and designation of land for exclusive Israeli use. This has been done through various measures, including the designation of certain areas as “State land”, closed military zones, national parks and archaeological sites, State support for the informal takeover of land and the encouragement of economic activities in the settlements. As a consequence of such policies, approximately 70 per cent of Area C land is off-limits for Palestinian construction and development and the situation in East Jerusalem has been profoundly altered. 22 Designation of “State land” and allocation of land for settlements 15. Over one third of Area C has been formally designated as public land (referred to as “State land” by Israel), following a process of land registration initiated under Jordanian rule and, since 1967, by the Israeli authorities. The vast majority of “State land” designations took place before the start of the Oslo peace process in the early 1990s. “State land” has been allocated exclusively for use by Israel and its citizens, rather than for the benefit of the local population, as required under international law.23 16. Land allocations to 24 Israeli regional and local settlement councils, comprising 126 settlements on approximately 63 per cent of Area C, typically encompass (in addition to built-up settlement areas) farmland, industrial zones, parks, access roads and security perimeters or buffer zones. 24 Such allocations result in a footprint that vastly exceeds builtup settlement areas, which amount to only around 2 per cent of Area C. 25 17. During the reporting period, the Israeli authorities declared over 200 hectares south of Jericho as “State land”. The Blue Line team in the Israeli Civil Administration tasked 20 21 22 23 24 25 4 Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics. Report of the Middle East Quartet of July 2016, pp. 5-6. Available from www.un.org/News/ dh/infocus/middle_east/Report-of-the-Middle-East-Quartet.pdf. Area C comprises approximately 60 per cent of the West Bank and includes most of the land reserves for a future Palestinian State. B’Tselem, By Hook and By Crook: Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank (July 2010), pp. 21-35. Available from www.btselem.org/download/201007_by_hook_and_by_crook_eng.pdf. Yesh Din, “Land takeover practices employed by Israel in the West Bank” (September 2016), p. 2. Ibid.