A/HRC/28/83 8. In 2013, the intervention by the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, and subsequently by MINUSMA and the French forces of Operation Serval, alongside the reconstituted Malian armed forces, led to the recapture of northern Mali from the control of extremist Islamist groups such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine. 9. A determining factor in the defeat of the extremist groups was the collapse of the alliance of convenience, which initially united the Malian Tuareg and Arab groups campaigning for autonomy or independence, and the subsequent involvement of those groups in the campaign against the jihadi groups. 10. This cooperation resulted in the conclusion of a preliminary agreement on presidential elections and inclusive peace negotiations in Mali, signed in Ouagadougou, on 18 June 2013, between the Transitional Government and the armed groups from the north. The agreement allowed elections to be held in favourable conditions across the whole country, with presidential elections on 28 July and 11 August 2013, and parliamentary elections on 24 November and 15 December 2013. The absolute majority polled by the party of President-elect Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, (Rassemblement pour Mali) with its allies would give significant parliamentary support to the President for his declared agenda of restoring peace, security and good governance. These advances laid the ground for political stability in the country in 2014. 11. Article 18 of the preliminary agreement of 18 June 2013 (Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement) provides for the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, sexual abuse and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law perpetrated by the belligerents during the war in the north of the country. Article 21 of the Agreement provides that, after the presidential elections, and 60 days after the new Government has taken office, the Government will engage in peace talks with all the communities from the north, as well as the signatories and armed groups that are party to the Preliminary Agreement, with a view to reaching a comprehensive and lasting peace. 12. The considerable delay in implementing these important provisions of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement by the newly elected authorities of Mali seriously threatened the greater political stability and improved security situation made possible by the Preliminary Agreement. A fragile truce prevailed among government troops and rebel groups in the north, while the representative of the rebel groups continued to meet with government officials in Bamako and elsewhere in neighbouring countries in an effort to relaunch the peace process with the support of MINUSMA. On the ground, real security problems persisted between the Malian armed forces and armed groups campaigning for independence, particularly in Kidal, the cradle of the Tuareg rebellion in Mali since its independence in 1960. 13. Another significant development on the political scene was the resignation, on 5 April 2014, of Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly. He was replaced by Moussa Mara, former presidential candidate and member of the Yelema party. 14. Efforts to relaunch the political process were seriously jeopardized by armed clashes that took place in Kidal, from 16 to 21 May 2014, between the Malian armed forces and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) supported by other associated armed groups. This violation of the ceasefire, in breach of article 10 of the Preliminary Agreement of Ouagadougou, brought a deterioration in the security situation and an increasingly fragile humanitarian and human rights situation for the civilian population. 15. A ceasefire agreement between the parties was signed, on 23 May 2014, following the intervention of the Mauritanian President, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The signatories to the agreement committed to revert to the provisions of the Ouagadougou Preliminary GE.15-00252 5

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