A/HRC/42/49 genuine reconciliation or transitional justice processes and the politicization of the work of the new Truth and Reconciliation Commission (risk factor 2 (g)); widespread mistrust of State institutions, particularly the security forces and the judicial system, as a result of impunity (risk factor 2 (h)). 83. Risk factor 3, the weakness of State structures, which negatively affects the capacity of a State to prevent, halt or prosecute atrocity crimes, is also present. National institutions, particularly judicial, law enforcement and human rights institutions, lack sufficient resources and adequate representation (risk factor 3 (b)); the justice system is neither independent nor impartial (risk factor 3 (c));33 civilian control of the security forces (by Parliament) is not effective (risk factor 3 (d)); there are high levels of corruption or poor governance (risk factor 3 (e));34 the internal oversight and accountability mechanisms whereby victims can seek recourse for their claims are inadequate or ineffective, and the external mechanisms are virtually non-existent or almost inaccessible to victims (risk factor 3 (f)). 84. Risk factor 4 is the existence of reasons, aims or drivers that justify the use of violence against particular groups. From an early warning perspective, it is important to be able to identify motivations or drivers that could encourage groups to resort to widespread violence in an attempt to achieve their goals. This factor is shown to be present by: politically motivated acts that, as regularly noted by members of the Government and CNDD-FDD, are aimed at the consolidation of power (risk factor 4 (a)); economic interests linked to the preservation of power, as power is the key to control over the distribution of resources (risk factor 4 (b)); real or perceived threats to the interests or objectives of the Government, including any form of disloyalty to the CNDD-FDD cause (risk factor 4 (e)); real or perceived membership of or support for armed opposition groups (risk factor 4 (f)); the ideology of CNDD-FDD, characterized by a view of the party as the embodiment of truth and thus belief in the supremacy of this political identity (risk factor 4 (g)); the politicization of past grievances, tensions or cases of impunity (risk factor 4 (h)); social trauma caused by past incidents of violence that, not adequately addressed, have aroused feelings of loss, displacement, injustice and a possible desire for revenge (risk factor 4 (i)). 85. Risk factor 5 refers to the capacity of potential perpetrators to commit atrocity crimes. This factor must be assessed in conjunction with other factors, such as those related to intent and motivation. In Burundi, this factor is gauged by: the availability of personnel and of arms and ammunition or of financial resources, public or private, for their procurement (risk factor 5 (a)); the capacity to transport and deploy personnel and to transport and distribute arms and ammunition (risk factor 5 (b)); the capacity to encourage or recruit large numbers of supporters – Imbonerakure, for example – from populations or groups and the availability of the means to mobilize them (risk factor 5 (c)); a strong culture of obedience to authority and group conformity, a culture by which CNDD-FDD and the Imbonerakure are characterized (risk factor 5 (d)); the presence of or links with other armed forces or with non-State armed groups (risk factor 5 (e)). 86. Mitigating factors are the internal and external elements that can contribute to preventing an escalation of violence, ending it or lessening its impact. The absence of such factors (risk factor 6) in Burundi is significant, as demonstrated by: the lack of a strong, organized and representative national civil society and of a free, diverse and independent national media (risk factor 6 (b)); the lack of access to international media (risk factor 6 (c)); the limited presence of the United Nations, international NGOs or other international or regional actors in the country with access to the people (risk factor 6 (d)); the lack of exposure to, openness towards or establishment of political or economic relations with other States (risk factor 6 (f)); the limited or even non-existent cooperation with international and regional human rights mechanisms (risk factor 6 (g)); the Government’s unwillingness to engage in genuine dialogue to resolve the 2015 crisis, make concessions or receive support from the international community (risk factor 6 (h)); the lack of a warning mechanism, as the National Observatory for the Prevention and Eradication of Genocide, 33 34 16 A/HRC/39/CRP.1, paras. 462–579. Ibid., paras. 179–215. GE.19-13419