A/HRC/45/CRP.4 37. Participants observed that provision of inadequate financial resources and weak institutional and technical capacity present significant challenges to implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. This situation is compounded by corruption and the lack of transparent and accountable management of available resources within the Government. Some stakeholders proposed that resources raised to support establishment and operation of transitional justice mechanisms should be managed by a third party. Role of the African Union 38. Ms. Hanna Tetteh, Special Representative to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union, during the workshop’s opening remarks, recognised the long history of the African Union’s role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in South Sudan. Notably, the findings of the AUCISS formed a basis for negotiations that resulted in various elements of the peace agreement, including recognition of the need to address entrenched impunity for past violations and serious crimes, and pursue genuine national processes for truth-seeking, reparation, healing, and reconciliation. 39. Participants were however concerned that the African Union and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights engagement on implementation of the RARCSS has, thus far, been one-sided, with a primary focus on the Government of South Sudan. They called on the AU to enhance its collaboration with opposition parties to the agreement, South Sudanese citizens, and civil society in its future engagements in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the people’s views and priorities. Participants were also curious about the utilisation of USD $10 million that is said to have been provided to the AU by the United States of America for establishment of the HCSS. They also expressed concern that there was little to no consultation by the AU with local civil society actors and victims/survivors on development of the draft Statute of the HCSS. Moreover, there was a general sense of frustration among key stakeholders on the lack of apparent action by the AU on the interim Transitional Government of South Sudan’s delay in signing the MoU and adoption of the Statute for establishment of the HCSS. This feeling seemed to stem from the belief by key actors and affected communities that the AU would play a more prominent role in pushing for implementation of the R-ARCSS by all parties. It was felt that, while the Transitional Government’s co-operation is necessary for establishment of the HCSS, the AU should strongly consider alternative measures within its broader regional mandate, given the Government’s manifest lack of political will, to end impunity for serious crimes in South Sudan. 40. Solomon Dersso, a Commissioner with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, submitted during deliberations that, beyond the R-ARCSS, the AU has a broader mandate to promote regional peace and security, and protect fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Study on Transitional Justice (TJ Study) and the AU’s recently launched Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) were identified as important bases for the AU’s support toward realisation of transitional justice in South Sudan. Significantly, the AUTJP mandates the AU to exercise political oversight over all transitional justice processes initiated in the African region. 41. Chris Gitari, an officer with R-JMEC, submitted that the AU holds a pivotal role and responsibility to promote transitional justice and sustenance of the peace agreement in South Sudan. Under the R-ARCSS, the R-TGoNU is obligated to co-operate with the AU in developing and implementing transitional justice measures; for its part, the AU is obligated to establish the HCSS and appoint its judges and prosecutors, and nominate Commissioners to the CTRH; and R-JMEC is required to report to the AU on the progress of implementation of the R-ARCSS. 42. A member of the Secretariat of the IGAD reminded participants that, while calling for enhanced interventions by the AU, all key actors should bear in mind the principle of subsidiarity, which places IGAD as the primary regional intervener in the South Sudan situation. Nonetheless, it was also underscored that subsidiarity anticipates the complementary involvement of the AU, UN, and other regional and international actors to advance peace and security based on their comparative advantage. In this case, the AU should 35