A/HRC/44/47/Add.1 bodies, institutions of civil society and recognized experts in the field of law (art. 5). The Council has broad competences in relation to: the selection of candidates for judicial office; the organization of initial and continuous training for judges; the evaluation and promotion of judges; and the handling of disciplinary proceedings against judges. It also has the power to elaborate law proposals aimed at strengthening judicial independence and improving access to justice (art. 6). 33. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the establishment of the Supreme Judicial Council through a constitutional provision, which emphasizes the vital role that such a council plays as a guarantor of judicial independence. 6 However, he considers that the provisions regarding the composition and functions of the Council are not fully in line with international standards, and do not provide sufficient guarantees to insulate the judiciary and judicial career processes from external political pressure, mainly from the executive branch.7 34. The inclusion in the Council of members who are not part of the judiciary contributes to minimizing the risk of corporatism and self-interest.8 Nonetheless, the criteria for the selection of non-judge members of the Council are not sufficiently defined. The lack of strict criteria for their selection allows, in practice, the appointment of candidates who may not have the necessary skills and qualifications, but who are chosen solely on the basis of their political affiliation. 35. The Law establishing the Council provides widespread powers to the President of Uzbekistan in relation to the appointment of Council members. The President has discretionary powers to appoint seven of its members and its Secretary. He or she also appoints 11 judge-members of the Council from a list prepared by the Chair of the Council. Finally, the President exercises a significant role in the selection of the Chair, who is appointed by the Senate (Oliy Majlis) upon nomination by the President, and the Deputy Chair, who is appointed directly by the President. 36. In order to insulate the Council from external political interference, the involvement of political authorities, such as the President, at any stage of the selection process should be avoided. Judge-members of the Council should be selected by their peers, through appropriate selection procedures guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary at all levels. The interference of the judicial hierarchies in this process should be avoided. The election of non-judge members should preferably be entrusted to a non-political body; in no case should they be selected, or appointed, by the executive branch.9 37. As to the appointment of the Chair of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Special Rapporteur considers that the Chair should be an impartial person who does not have any political affiliation, and should be elected by the Council itself from among its judgemembers. In the light of his or her functions, the President of the Supreme Court should not be appointed as the Chair of a judicial council. 10 3. Selection and appointment of judges 38. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the new procedure for the selection and appointment of candidates to judicial offices, which entrusts key competences in relation to judicial appointments to the Supreme Judicial Council. 39. The Council is now responsible for the selection and appointment of the majority of national judges (judges of military courts, regional courts and Tashkent city courts, Chairs 6 7 8 9 10 8 A/HRC/38/38, para. 42. See also Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “Opinion on the Law on the High Judicial Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan”, Opinion-Nr.: JUD-UZB/327/2018, 1 October 2018, paras. 22–29; and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Uzbekistan: 4th Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, 2019, pp. 104–106. A/HRC/38/38, paras. 72–73. Ibid., paras. 76–77 and 108. Ibid., para. 112.