A/HRC/41/35/Add.4 I. Introduction 1. Surveillance technologies are increasingly used by governments around the world to monitor and interfere with the private communications of activists, journalists, academics, opposition figures, dissenters and other figures in civil society. While mass surveillance (i.e. bulk collection of intercepted communications) has been on the global policy agenda at least since the revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013, comparatively less attention – whether press, legislative or regulatory – has been devoted to targeted surveillance using the increasingly available tools developed and marketed by private industry. Yet there is virtually no oversight of the work of these companies, which operate in the shadows of government and inter-governmental activity. While government surveillance is often targeted at civil society in their own states, the surveillance may often have cross-border impact. State surveillance and attack can have a particular chilling effect on members of civil society organizations such as journalists, activists, and academics, ultimately deterring the free expression of information and ideas. II. Objectives 2. The overall objective of this consultation was to discuss and better understand the threat to individual rights and civic space that stems from the collaboration between private surveillance companies and governments with the involvement of experts in the field of surveillance, targets of surveillance and related threats. More specifically, this consultation allowed participants to: 3. Explore different types of surveillance tools, how they are marketed, sold, and regulated, how governments utilize private surveillance mechanisms, and how civil society can be empowered to respond. 4. Address a major gap in legal frameworks, at the domestic, regional and international level, concerning the control and use of such technologies. 5. Discuss the development of rights-oriented approaches to address the responsibility of state actors and private actors, and the regulation of the surveillance tools they produce. 6. Prepare upcoming reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression and opinion and the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of association and peaceful assembly that will explore this important issue and the role that the international community may play in developing international standards in this space. III. Background/Participants 7. The meeting involved a diverse and tech-savvy group of participants, many of them with a solid background in human rights law and/or surveillance technologies. Participants were carefully selected depending on their expertise in the control of surveillance technologies and ability to enrich the discussions with different perspectives. It brought together 19 experts coming from Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Italy, India, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States. Among them 9 were females and 10 males. A. Session 1: surveillance of Civil Society: overview of trends and threats 8. In this session, participants discussed the historical context surrounding surveillance of society, the transformation of surveillance in the digital age, and the variety of ways surveillance can be conducted and impact human rights. Ultimately, participants agreed that surveillance tools create threats to human life, personal safety, cause reputational harm, and undermine public trust. 9. There was a consensus among participants that the overall discussion about human rights risks in relation to surveillance is quite broad. Participants noted that society has had 3