A/HRC/41/35/Add.4 Key questions 47. What should a private surveillance company’s responsibility to respect end-users’ rights encompass? 48. What are elements of a persuasive advocacy strategy vis-a-vis these companies? 49. The issues of digital security vulnerabilities, the relationship between the companies that develop surveillance tools and governments that buy these technologies and applicable normative frameworks were at the core of this discussion. 50. Several participants of this group underlined the limitations and constraints associated with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and called for the development of additional norms to ensure the accountability of the private sector in this field. The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies was discussed as an example on how to provide incentives for States to ensure corporate compliance with international human rights standards. Participants argued that similar codes of conduct or standards could be adopted and applied to the issue of private surveillance. 51. Given the potential risk of misuse and adverse impact on human rights, the importance for companies to contract directly and only with those who can legally use their product and services was underlined. Furthermore, companies should resist demands from governments to make products less safe and should instead invest in the safety of their products. 52. The option of establishing a multi-stakeholder review entity has also been put forward by one of the participants. Some participants stressed the need for companies, as part of their due diligence obligations, to cooperate with investigations into alleged abuses. 53. Other recommendations include: identifying and engaging public facing companies based on the importance of their public image and reputation, persuading governments that these tools may eventually be used against them, and encouraging the development of extraterritorial norms. 54. The third breakout group focuses on controls on transfer, international and domestic. Key questions 55. What are the key improvements necessary in the international regime governing transfer of surveillance technology? 56. Is it even subject to such control? 57. The absence of enforcement mechanism within the Wassenaar Agreement has been identified as one of the biggest challenge associated with the international regime control. Hence, several participants proposed the creation of a report mechanism within the agreement. 58. Many participants emphasized the need for greater transparency from States on the list of items that are being exported and under which criterion the export is authorized. The group agreed that civil society organizations should be able to provide their inputs on export controls. It was also said that exporting countries should only allow licenses for technologies to be used in countries with an appropriate level of human rights commitment. One participant also stressed the importance of developing a mechanism outside of Wassenaar that would foster collaboration and information sharing for the purposes of strategic litigation. 59. Issues of due diligence also generated some discussion. Several participants agreed on the importance to adopt more clear and concrete rules following the UN Guiding Principles. 60. The group ended its presentation addressing two questions to the audience: 61. What is the role for international sanctions in cases where the importing State lacks the requisite commitments to human rights? 62. What incentives can be provided to bring more countries into compliance with export control regimes (at both local and international levels)? 8