A/HRC/41/51 34. While these national laws have played an important deterrent role, it is evident that concerns raised by the activities of vulture funds can only be effectively tackled if more countries pass national laws to limit their claims. To avoid “forum shopping” strategies, regulation is particularly needed in those jurisdictions preferred by vulture funds for starting litigation or enforcing attachments. 35. National legislators may resort to useful guidelines deriving from existing domestic laws and experience of implementation, namely: (a) protection should be extended to any debt-distressed country and not only to heavily indebted poor countries; (b) procedures should allow for the identification of debts that are protected from the claims of vulture funds, on the basis of objective criteria; (c) concerns about the socioeconomic situation of the debtor State and the well-being of its population should be adequately incorporated and addressed by the legislator; and (d) issues regarding the lack of transparency in the secondary debt market and the operation of vulture funds in tax havens should be also tackled. Belgium 36. Belgium was the first country to enact national legislation against the activities of vulture funds.35 In 2008, a first law responded to the numerous lawsuits lodged by vulture funds before national courts aimed at seizing official funds allocated by Belgium to official development aid to certain countries. 36 37. In 2015, a new law set out a more detailed framework, fixing limits to the amount that vulture funds could legitimately claim. 37 A threshold (the price paid to repurchase the loan or debt) was established for those cases where it could be demonstrated that the creditor’s repurchase pursued an “illegitimate advantage”. 38. There is such “illegitimate advantage” when: (a) There is a “manifest disproportion” between the repurchase prices of the loan or debt and the face value of the amounts that the creditor seeks to recover from the State; (b) One or more of the following criteria is met: (i) The debtor State was insolvent (or a default was imminent) at the time of the debt buy-back; (ii) The creditor is based in a tax haven or similar jurisdiction; (iii) The creditor systematically uses legal proceedings to obtain repayment; (iv) The creditor refused to take part in debt restructuring efforts; (v) The creditor abused the weakness of the State to negotiate a repayment which is manifestly unbalanced; (vi) The total reimbursement of the amounts demanded by the creditor would have a measurably adverse impact on the public finances of the State and would be likely to compromise the socioeconomic development of its population. 39. The law is not limited to heavily indebted poor countries and provides comprehensive protection against litigation by vulture funds. It integrates human rights concerns, while taking due account of the important public interests at stake when dealing with sovereign debt.38 Requiring the judges to make an assessment of the impact that the repayment of the debt might have on the socioeconomic situation of the debtor State and on the well-being of its population is certainly an innovative element and one of the most prominent aspects of this legislation. 35 36 37 38 Law aimed at preventing the seizure or transfer of public funds allocated to development aid, particularly by the strategies of vulture funds, 6 April 2008. Ten lawsuits were lodged against the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 alone. Law relating to the fight against the activities of vulture funds, 12 July 2015. Chamber of Representatives of Belgium, Draft law relating to the fight against the activities of vulture funds, doc. 54 0394/001, 7 October 2014. 9