A/HRC/9/23 page 21 investors,45 a result of the low returns of stock markets and of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, has helped push the international prices of such commodities upwards on specialized boards, such as the Chicago Board of Trade. 42. Mechanisms such as the constitution of strategic grain reserves at the national, or preferably at the local level, could go a long way towards combating the impact of price volatility, thus making non-commercial speculation less attractive. Local grain banks in rural communities in the most vulnerable parts of the world should therefore be supported. Access and control should be entrusted to local communities and, where possible, stocks should be built of locally produced and consumed staple food. However, more attention should be paid by the international community to this phenomenon, as States acting unilaterally may find it difficult to effectively tackle the impact of speculation on the prices on international markets, for instance by improving the regulation of investment funds or by taxing such movement of funds. 43. One proposal made is the pooling of one portion of the strategic grain reserves detained by States, in order to establish what the leaders of the Group of Eight referred to as “a ‘virtual’ internationally coordinated reserve system for humanitarian purposes”.46 The main objective of such a virtual global strategic reserve would be to ensure that States facing an emergency, for instance due to a conflict or to weather-related events, could acquire food at a price which is reasonable and, especially, predictable, since prices would be based on a commitment of the States participating in the global reserve to sell at pre-defined prices. One benefit of such a scheme would be that speculation would not be encouraged by sudden shocks, since the countries having to import urgently large quantities of food would not be going through the usual market mechanisms.47 A more ambitious version of this proposal would be to re-establish international buffer stocks in order to stabilize the price of food commodities, as was done in the 1960s and 1970s, for instance through the International Cocoa Agreement or the International Coffee Agreement. Provided that such agreements attracted support from a sufficiently large number of importing and exporting country members and set target prices at realistic levels, and could be funded at sufficiently high levels in order to cover the risks of long periods of low prices, they could have an important stabilizing function, to the benefit of exporting and importing countries alike. Again, since speculation has its origin in the expectations of future prices, price-stabilizing measures such as through the re-establishment of international buffer stocks would discourage speculation, preventing its negative effects on spot prices for commercial traders and consumers alike. 45 It has been reported that total index-fund investment in corn, soybeans, wheat, cattle and hogs has increased in 2007 to more than 47 billion USD, from 10 billion USD in 2006. See David Kesmodel, Laurent Etter and Aaron O. Patrick, ‘Grain Companies’ Profits Soar As Global Food Crisis Mounts’, The Wall Street Journal, 30 April 2008, pages A1 and A14. 46 47 See also the Comprehensive Framework for Action, at 27-28. See also, favouring such a solution, IFPRI, High Food Prices: The What, Who, and How of Proposed Policy Actions, 16 May 2008, at 9-10.