A/HRC/39/43 14. In March 2017, OCHA announced that Yemen had become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. As of May 2018, out of a population of 29.3m, nearly 17.8m were food insecure and 8.4m people were on the brink of famine. The hungry are even more susceptible to other health complications, including contracting disease. Since April 2017, a cholera epidemic has swept through Yemen at an unprecedented scale. Scarcity of fuel further drives the health crisis, limiting both the functioning of medical facilities and water supply. Proportionality Assessment Harm to the Civilian Population 15. The harm to Yemen’s civilian population caused by severe restrictions on naval imports was foreseeable, given the country’s pre-conflict reliance on imports and the criticality of Hudaydah port. The reliance of the population on naval imports for basic survival, and the harm, including injury and death, that would be caused by the economic impact of a disruption to that pipeline, were knowable facts available to those who planned and implemented the naval restrictions. 16. Moreover, a proportionality assessment need not be static. The continuing nature of such naval restrictions requires a continuing assessment. Most explicitly, the November 2017 blockade presented a juncture that required an updated assessment. The coalition had an obligation to reassess the effects of their methods on the civilian population, and the proportionality thereof. By then, the international community had repeatedly underscored the effects of the existing restrictions and had warned of catastrophic effects of the announced closure of all ports. 17. An additional concern is that the longer the restrictions last, the more difficult it will be for the civilian population to recover. Military Advantage 18. According to coalition public statements, the restrictions are intended to enforce the arms embargo of Resolution 2216 (2015). The coalition has specifically highlighted Houthi use of ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia. 19. The Experts make no assessment as to whether the restrictions could have been anticipated to be effective when first announced in 2015. But as the situation evolved, the contrary became evident, particularly in light of measures such as UNVIM. The restrictions are also unlikely to be effective in the absence of a clear and published list of prohibited items.11 20. Additional evidence of the ineffectiveness of the restrictions comes from the reports of the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts tasked to investigate violations of the arms embargo. The Panel has found there is no indication that ballistic missiles are entering Yemen via Red Sea ports, and low likelihood that other weapons are. 12 In the years that the naval restrictions have been in place, no searches by either UNVIM or coalition forces have discovered weapons.13 21. Any effectiveness of the restrictions has clearly been limited, given that the Houthis continue to demonstrate the capability to strike Saudi Arabia with missiles. 22. All of these factors combined lead to the conclusion that the coalition naval restrictions cannot be reasonably expected to achieve the concrete and direct military advantage of preventing Houthi arms smuggling. Even if such a conclusion was not knowable in March 2015, it became increasingly obvious as the months and years passed. 11 12 13 The law of contraband requires published, reasonably specific contraband lists. San Remo Manual (1994) para.149. S/2018/68 Annex 33. S/2018/68 para.78. 31