A/HRC/13/29 53. The process of formally designating a national human rights institution can include a reflection on the adequacy of the mandate of the institution for the purpose of article 33, which in some cases might reveal opportunities for strengthening compliance with the Paris Principles. The submission of Sweden, for example, notes that the current mandate of the Equality Ombudsman is limited in scope and suggests its expansion.35 54. In other cases, a review of how persons with disabilities participate in existing national human rights institutions may highlight the need to revise the composition of the institution and strengthen pluralism. The German Institute for Human Rights, for example, upon its designation expanded the composition of its board to include an organization of persons with disabilities.36 55. It should also be noted that the designation of a national human rights institution as the independent mechanism will most likely require internal structural changes, and that additional financial and human resources will almost always be required. The Ombudsman of Azerbaijan, the Guatemalan Ombudsman, the Kenyan Human Rights Commission and the New Zealand Human Rights Commission all highlight in their submissions organizational issues and in some cases concern at the impact the designation could have on existing limited resources.37 56. Where no entities exist at national level in line with the Paris Principles, consideration should be given to establishing such an institution. The submission by the Netherlands, for example, states that a national human rights institution that complies with the Paris Principles will be established for the tasks arising from article 33, paragraph 2.38 Similarly, the Austrian Independent Monitoring Committee on the Convention, on the basis of its self-assessment of non-compliance with the Paris Principles, has recommended the establishment of a national human rights institution that complies with the Principles.39 3. Organizational form 57. As mentioned earlier, article 33 of the Convention does not prescribe a unique organizational form for the national monitoring framework. Beside appointment of a single independent mechanism to carry out functions under article 33, paragraph 2, the Convention also foresees the possibility that more than one independent mechanism be appointed in the framework, as appropriate, with the effect that States in fact establish a “mechanism of mechanisms” to promote, protect and monitor implementation. 58. This possibility seems to address States parties with multiple levels of government, such as federal states and analogous entities. The United Kingdom, for example, which has in place a system of devolved executive and legislative powers in Scotland and Northern Ireland, has designated as independent mechanisms institutions operating both at central government level and in the devolved administrations.40 Some federal states such as Argentina or Mexico already have in place State-level human rights commissions or ombudsmen which could be potentially designated as the independent mechanism. Belgium 35 36 37 38 39 40 GE.09-17748 Ibid. Presentation by Valentin Aichele, head of the national monitoring body for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, German Institute for Human Rights, at the meeting on national implementation and monitoring bodies, European Foundation Centre and European Disability Forum seminar, Brussels, 28 October 2009. See submissions at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/submissions.htm. See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/Netherlands_10909.doc. See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/AustrianMonitoringBody.pdf. See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/UnitedKingdom061009.doc. 13