A/HRC/21/46 2. Trust 32. The other mediate aim that the components of the mandate seek to attain is the promotion of trust. Trust in this context is meant to involve both trust between individuals and trust of the individuals in State institutions. As the resolution 18/7 puts it, the expectation is that the implementation of the measures will “restore confidence in the institutions of the State”. Trust is not the same as mere predictability or empirical regularity; it involves an expectation of a shared normative commitment and, therefore, develops out of a mutual sense of commitment to these shared norms and values. 33. Trusting institutions means knowing and recognizing as valid the values and norms guiding an institution and deriving from this commitment the assumption that an institutional set-up resting on such norms and values makes sufficient sense to a sufficient number of people to motivate their ongoing active support for these institutions and the compliance with their grounding norms and values. Successful institutions generate a feedback loop: they make sense to actors who will in turn support them and comply with what the institutionally defined order prescribes. 16 In conclusion, trusting an institution amounts to knowing that its constitutive rules, values and norms are shared by its members or participants and are regarded by them as binding. 34. To illustrate how transitional justice measures can contribute to (re)building this type of confidence, it should be noted that prosecutions reaffirm the relevance of the norms that perpetrators violated, norms which turn natural persons into rights holders. Judicial institutions, particularly in contexts in which they have traditionally been essentially instruments of power, show their trustworthiness if they can establish that no one is above the law. Truth-seeking can foster trust by responding to the anxieties of those whose confidence was shattered by experiences of violence and/or abuse, who are fearful that the past might repeat itself. An institutionalized effort to confront the past might be seen by those who were formerly on the receiving end of violence as an effort in good faith to come clean, understand long-term patterns of socialization and the distribution of power and opportunities and thereby initiate a new political project around norms and values that this time are truly shared. 17 Reparations can foster trust by demonstrating the seriousness with which institutions now take rights violations. Trust is bolstered when, even under conditions of scarcity and competition for resources, the State responds to the obligation to fund programmes that benefit those who were formerly not only marginalized but abused. 18 Finally, vetting of public officials can induce confidence by demonstrating a commitment to systemic norms governing employee hiring and retention, disciplinary oversight and prevention of cronyism. 19 35. Both recognition and trust are preconditions and consequences of justice. A system of justice unwilling to take seriously the status of its members as holders of rights is unimaginable. 20 So is one that systematically fails to materialize the commitments to the 16 17 18 19 20 Claus Offe, “How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?” in Democracy and Trust, Mark Warren, ed., (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 70–71. See Pablo de Greiff, “Truth Telling and the Rule of Law” in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies, Tristan Anne Borer, ed. (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame, 2006). See De Greiff, “Justice and Reparations”. See Pablo de Greiff, “Vetting and Transitional Justice” in Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff, eds. (Social Science Research Council, 2007). As Jürgen Habermas puts the point, “the legal medium as such presupposes rights that define the status of legal persons as bearers of rights”. Habermas and William Rehg, Between Facts and Norms: 11