A/HRC/4/42 page 13 shooting against cars on the streets of Baghdad, with indications of deadly impact.13 According to the persons in the vehicle from where the shots were made, it constituted part of a convoy of vehicles of PMSCs.14 One commentator’s analysis indicated that private contractors, due to fear, often shoot randomly on the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities to ensure priority and to keep a distance from other vehicles.15 36. As with the traditional and legal definition of a “mercenary”, whose main motivation is personal enrichment and material compensation, PMSCs seek maximum financial return for the services they offer their clients. These motivations of PMSCs, which often seek to recruit contractors at lower cost to increase profits, have led to situations where contracts from Governments, such as the United States Department of Defense or the Department of State, are subcontracted to subsidiary companies. For example, the Working Group has received information that the original contract may generate approximately US$ 11,000 per security guard per month for performing security services in countries of conflict. However, it is common for the originally contracted PMSC to engage a second, third or fourth subcontracting private entity to fulfil the original contract in full or in part. These processes often result in subcontractors recruiting staff, and performing training, in countries with low labour costs and high unemployment rates. The Working Group has received information of subcontracted individuals who may receive salaries reduced to between US$ 1,000 and 2,000, with the surplus absorbed by the originally contracted PMSC or divided among the layers of subcontracted PMSCs. Furthermore, the Working Group is concerned that this profit-maximization of PMSCs can create incentives for duplication of costly services, and which are largely beyond the control of judicial accountability as well as of the military regular forces and their chains of command. 37. The Working Group is also concerned at what point the motivation of PMSCs for profit can lead to situations where national subsidiaries of large transnational PMSCs recruit personnel to be sent to countries of conflict as security guards, but upon arrival are assigned and expected to perform military functions for which they were not contracted or agreed to. The same motivations could have effects on situations such as the PMSC which was in charge of protecting a United States convoy that was passing through Falluja, Iraq, when its personnel were killed on 31 March 2004. The four guards were seized by Iraqi insurgents, dragged and burnt; scenes which have been broadcast worldwide.16 The families of those guards filed a lawsuit against the PMSC in January 2005 for not having provided sufficient personnel and adequate means 13 Broadcast on 13 June 2006; available at www.cnn.com, and the transcript at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0606/12/acd.02.html. 14 David Phinney, “From mercenaries to peacemakers?”, 29 November 2005, www.corpwatch.org. 15 Sean Rayment, “Iraq: video exposes private security convoys shooting Iraqi drivers”, News Telegraph, 27 November 2005, www.corpwatch.org. 16 This incident led to the seizure of Falluja by coalition forces in April 2004, which led to approximately 600 casualites.