A/HRC/24/47 activities particularly affects vulnerable sections of the population. The Assistant SecretaryGeneral for Human Rights noted that, since the occupation of Northern Mali by Islamist groups, women have been subjected to various forms of mistreatment and deprived of their fundamental rights to employment, education and general services. 70 Similarly, children have been enrolled in armed groups and deprived of, among others, their right to education.71 33. Most terrorist hostage-takers characteristically demand high sums of money to be paid by families, Governments, employers or those insuring the hostages. In many cases, the families of captives have no other choice but to pay large sums of money to save the lives of their loved ones; they therefore bear the economic burden of paying the ransom where no other actors are willing or expected to pay. It has been documented that the payment of large ransoms can completely wipe out family savings and leave the victimized family destitute. To make matters worse, Governments rarely provide full restitution of economic loss to the victims.72 34. Studies suggest that, in many cases, large ransoms lead to “a vicious cycle in which kidnapping is seen as more remunerative by more criminals; larger numbers of victims are taken; higher ransoms are sought and paid; and the frequency of kidnappings in a particular country or region begins to spiral out of control”. 73 In some contexts, the money raised from ransoms is used to finance a guerrilla war or terrorist-type activities.74 35. Similar examples from North Africa, Latin America, Iraq and Afghanistan show that hostage-takers generally use ransom money to strengthen their criminal enterprises. The extortion of ransoms fuels sub-economies and provides capital for both terrorist and criminal activities. The payment of ransom not only encourages further hostage-taking, but inevitably results in further terrorist attacks, leading to the injury and death of civilians. 75 Consequently, some have suggested that policies aimed at limiting concessions to terrorist hostage-takers, including non-payment of ransom, would certainly curb the phenomenon since potential actors would have no incentive to engage in hostage-taking activities without realistic chances of obtaining ransom. 76 The divergent positions on ransom payment are examined in the sections below. IV. Role of regional and international cooperation A. Overview, good practices and challenges 36. Reactions and responses to terrorist hostage-taking situations vary according to the context and actors involved. While during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the prevailing response to hostage incidents was the use of overwhelming physical force, in recent years, armed response has generally yielded to the techniques of negotiation and 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 See www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2012/121010_Guest.doc.htm. UN News Centre, “Mali: UNICEF warns of armed groups recruiting children”, 17 August 2012. Available from www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42697&Cr=Mali&Cr1=#.UW12a6J-ZYU. Cecilia M. Bailliet, “Towards holistic transnational protection: an overview of international public law approaches to kidnapping”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 38, No. 4, 2010, p. 584. Wright, Kidnap for Ransom (see footnote 47), pp. 73–74. Bloomfield, “Hostage taking and government response” (see footnote 19), p. 23. S/2009/502, para. 60. Charlinda Santifort and Todd Sandler, “Terrorist success in hostage-taking missions: 1978–2010”, Public Choice, July 2012. Available from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-012-0008-z. 13