A/HRC/12/48 page 261 and, crucially, without access to markets, it could no longer fulfil the role of shock absorber.604 In its submission to the Mission, UNCTAD noted that when the industrial and agricultural sectors lost their capacity to provide jobs, public administration and services absorbed up to 54 per cent of Gaza’s labour force (up from 37 per cent in 1999). UNCTAD concluded: The ultimate impact of this momentum is the systematic erosion of the Palestinian productive base to deprive them from the ability to produce and feed themselves, and turn them into poor consumers of essential goods imported mainly from Israel and financed mainly by donors. 1227. The military operations destroyed a substantial part of the Gaza Strip’s economic infrastructure and its capacity to support decent livelihoods for families. Many factories and businesses were directly targeted and destroyed or damaged. Poverty, unemployment and food insecurity increased dramatically. 1228. Information provided to the Mission showed that some 700 private (industry and trade) businesses were damaged or destroyed during the military operations, with direct losses totalling approximately US$ 140 million. The industrial sector appeared the most affected, as it suffered 61 per cent of those losses, in particular in the sub-sectors of construction and food.605 Because of the extent and gravity of the destruction inflicted on the industrial sector, businesspeople and industrialists who spoke to the Mission stated their belief that Israel had as one of its military objectives the destruction of local industrial capacity so as to harm the prospects for an economic recovery in the Gaza Strip.606 1229. The severe restrictions on the availability of banknotes imposed by Israel caused serious disruptions in economic transactions and affected the ability of the public sector and the nongovernmental sector to carry out operations such as contracting or procuring goods and services. 1230. The agricultural sector, including crop farming, fisheries, livestock farming and poultry farming, suffered direct losses worth some US$ 170 million. Indirect losses have still to be definitively calculated. One business organization estimates that 60 per cent of all agricultural land had been destroyed, 40 per cent directly during the military operations.607 Moreover, 17 per cent of all orchards, 8.3 per cent of livestock, 2.6 per cent of poultry, 18.1 per cent of hatcheries, 25.6 per cent of beehives, 9.2 per cent of open fields and 13 per cent of groundwater wells were destroyed. Agriculture had already lost a third of its capacity since the start of the second intifada and the frequent Israeli incursions, according to NGO estimates used by UNDP-Gaza.608 Parts of Meetings with representatives from the agricultural sector in Gaza, 30 June 2009; meeting with representatives of Campaign to End the Siege, Gaza, 29 June 2009. 604 Private Sector Coordination Council Gaza Governorates, “Gaza private sector: Post-war status and needs”, 25 February 2009. 605 Interviews with Amr Hamad of the Palestinian Federation of Industries and with Ali Abu Shalah of the Palestinian Business Association. 606 607 “Gaza private sector: post-war status…”, p. 5. UNDP, FAO and Ministry of Agriculture, “Assessment of impact of cast lead operation: estimated direct losses to agriculture in the Gaza Strip between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009”. 608