A/HRC/12/48 page 181 805. The second policy clearly emerging from the soldiers’ testimonies is explained by one of the soldiers as follows: “One of the things in this procedure [the outpost procedure, which is being applied in areas held by the Israeli armed forces after the Gaza ground invasion] is setting red lines. It means that whoever crosses this limit is shot, no questions asked. […] Shoot to kill.”447 In one incident highly relevant to the cases investigated by the Mission because of factual similarities, a soldier recounted an event he witnessed.448 A family is ordered to leave their house. For reasons that remain unclear, probably a misunderstanding, the mother and two children turn left instead of right after having walked between 100 and 200 metres from their house. They thereby cross a “red line” established by the Israeli unit (of whose existence the mother and children could have no knowledge). An Israeli marksman on the roof of the house they had just left opens fire on the woman and her two children, killing them. As the soldier speaking at the Rabin Academy’s “Fighters’ Talk” a month later observes, “from our perspective, he [the marksman] did his job according to the orders he was given”. 806. “Incessant” alerts about suicide bombers449 meant that even civilians clearly identified by the soldiers as carrying no arms were perceived as a threat as soon as they came within a certain distance from the soldiers – a threat to be eliminated, also without warning fire, as a second might be enough for the “suicide bomber” to get close enough to harm the soldiers. 807. The Mission notes that many of the persons interviewed in Gaza described incidents in which they were, individually, as part of a group or in a vehicle, exposed to intense gunfire from Israeli soldiers – but without being hit or injured. This was the case, for instance, of an ambulance drivers attempting to drive into an area which the Israeli armed forces had decided he should not enter.450 In the Khuza’a case, after the lethal shooting of Rouhiyah al-Najjar and wounding of Yasmine al-Najjar, the other women and children were exposed to fire from the Israeli soldiers, which forced them to retreat to the houses they had been trying to leave.451 These incidents suggest that the Israeli armed forces made ample use of gunfire to “communicate” with the civilian population, to issue injunctions to civilians not to walk or not to drive any further in a certain direction or to immediately retreat to a building they were about to leave. The terrifying effect this sort of non-verbal communication had on those at the receiving end is evident, as is the likelihood of lethal consequences. 808. The Mission also read testimony from soldiers who recounted cases in which, although a civilian had come within a distance from them which would have required opening fire under the rules imparted to them, they decided not to shoot because they did not consider the civilian a threat to them. Ibid., testimony 12, p. 32, also testimony 21, p. 52; and the of “Ram” in the Rabin Academy Fighters’ Talk, pp. 6-7. 447 Testimony of “Ram” in the Rabin Academy Fighters’ Talk, pp. 6-7. The Mission notes that “Ram” clearly states that he was an eyewitness to the incident. 448 449 For instance, Soldiers’ Testimonies…, testimony 13, p. 37, and testimony 22, p. 53. Interview with Marwan Abu Reda, 11 June 2009. For a description of warning shots in front of moving vehicles, see Soldiers’ Testimonies…, testimony 12, p. 33. 450 451 This would appear to have been the case also in the shooting of Majda and Rayya Hajaj in Juhr ad-Dik.