A/HRC/12/48 page 250 1176. From the facts ascertained by it, the Mission believes that there has also been a violation of articles 7 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as of article 14 ICCPR with regard to the right to be brought before a judge at the earliest opportunity, the right to be informed of the charges against one, the right to consult with legal counsel and the right to be provided with a meaningful opportunity to defend oneself. XVI. OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY OF ISRAEL’S MILITARY OPERATIONS IN GAZA 1177. This chapter addresses the objectives and the strategy underlying the Israeli military operations in Gaza. A. Planning 1178. The question of whether incidents involving the Israeli armed forces that occurred between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 are likely to be the result of error, the activities of rogue elements or a deliberate policy or planning depends on a number of factors, including the degree and level of planning involved, the degree of discretion field commanders have in operations, the technical sophistication and specification of weaponry, and the degree of control commanders have over their subordinates. 1179. The Government of Israel has refused to cooperate with the Mission. The Mission has therefore been unable to interview high-level members of the Israeli armed forces. It has, nevertheless, reviewed a significant amount of commentary and conducted a number of interviews on planning and discipline, including with persons who have been connected with the planning of Israeli military operations in the recent past. The Mission has also analysed the views expressed by Israeli officials in official statements, official activities and articles, and considered comments by former senior soldiers and politicians. 1. The context 1180. Before considering the issue of planning there is an important issue that has to be borne in mind about the context of Israeli operations in Gaza. The land mass of Gaza covers 360 square kilometres of land. Israel had a physical presence on the ground for almost 40 years with a significant military force until 2005. Israel’s extensive and intimate knowledge of the realities of Gaza present a considerable advantage in terms of planning military operations. The Mission has seen grid maps in possession of the Israeli armed forces, for example, that show the identification by number of blocks of houses throughout Gaza City. 1181. In addition to such detailed background knowledge, it is also clear that the Israeli armed forces were able to access the telephone networks to contact a significant number of users in the course of their operations.565 1182. Since the departure of its ground forces from Gaza in 2005, Israel has maintained almost total control over land access and total control over air and sea access.566 This has also included 565 See “The operation in Gaza…”, paras. 8, 24, 138, 264, 350, 354, 375, 389 and 447.