A/HRC/35/22 applications is blocked, throttled or rendered “effectively unusable”.7 Shutdowns may affect towns or regions within a country, an entire country or even multiple countries and may last for periods ranging from hours to months. 9. Shutdowns ordered covertly or without an obvious legal basis violate the requirement of article 19 (3) of the Covenant that restrictions be “provided by law”. In Chad, the failure of authorities to provide a meaningful public explanation for a series of Internet and social media shutdowns between February and October 2016 created the presumption that they were unlawful. 8 In Gabon, total network outages were allegedly recorded every evening for almost two weeks during the 2016 election period, contrary to government assurances that such services would not be disrupted.9 10. Shutdowns ordered pursuant to vaguely formulated laws and regulations also fail to satisfy the legality requirement. In Tajikistan, the amended Law on the State of Emergency authorizes the Government to block mobile services and Internet access without a court order following the declaration of a state of emergency. 10 The law fails to define when and for what purposes a state of emergency may be declared. Such ambiguity enables authorities’ unfettered discretion to implement shutdowns. In some countries, authorities rely on antiquated laws to justify shutdowns. 11 Laws and regulations adopted and implemented in secret also violate the legality requirement. In the United States of America, the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications has largely redacted public release of standard operating procedure 303, an executive regulation that establishes “detailed procedures” on the “disruption of cellular service.”12 While these procedures have not been publicly invoked, the potential for authorities to evade legal scrutiny and public accountability runs contrary to article 19 of the Covenant. 11. Restrictions on expression must be necessary to achieve aims specified by article 19 (3) of the Covenant and may never be invoked to justify the suppression of advocacy for democratic rights (see Human Rights Committee general comment No. 34, para. 23; and A/71/373, para. 26). However, governments frequently impose shutdowns during demonstrations, elections and other events of extraordinary public interest, with little or no explanation. 13 In Bahrain, disruptions to mobile and Internet access in Duraz allegedly coincided with sit-ins outside the home of a prominent religious leader whose citizenship the Government had revoked.14 Internet users in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were reportedly denied Internet access during widespread protests against the Government in 2014.15 Network disruptions have been recorded during or around elections or protests in 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Access Now submission, part I, p. 1. Internet Sans Frontières submission, p. 2, TCD 3/2016. Ibid., GAB 1/2016. OHCHR, “Preliminary observations by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. David Kaye, at the end of his visit to Tajikistan, press release (9 March 2015). India, Code of Criminal Procedure, sect. 144; also Apar Gupta and Raman Jit Singh Chima, “The cost of internet shutdowns”, The Indian Express (26 October 2016). United States of America, NCC Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 303. Access Now submission, part I, pp. 5-7. Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Digital Rights Derailed in Bahrain (2016), pp. 13-14. Danny O’Brien, “Venezuela’s Internet crackdown escalates into regional blackout”, Electronic Frontier Foundation (20 February 2014). 5