A/HRC/24/42 a selection panel with seats apportioned to the representatives of different stakeholders including victims’ groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), professional associations, religious organizations, local leaders and even representatives of the international community. The panel accepts submissions from the public, determines a shortlist of candidates, orders them by rank, and passes on the recommendation to an appointing authority. In some countries public hearings with those shortlisted were also required. 57. A thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of the two selection methods is beyond the aim of this report. However, some observations are in order. First, there is no fail-safe method of selection. While the overwhelming majority of commissioners have made important contributions, neither method has proven to be immune from occasionally questionable appointments. Second, both selection methods, while entailing certain advantages, involve costs. Direct appointments are expeditious, but the method does not check for potential narrowness in the range of candidates considered by the appointing authority. 58. Countries have opted for consultative processes for reasons that include: increasing the representativeness of commission members, broadening the pool of candidates, strengthening popular “buy in” and legitimacy. Indeed, these are valid arguments that speak in favour of consultative procedures in many domains. There are, of course, negatives, such as the lengthy amount of time which the operation of selection mechanisms requires. 73 A less explored risk relates to the incentives that consultative procedures create for overemphasizing “representativeness” as a criterion of selection. 59. The use of selection panels is certainly more appropriate than the effort to guarantee representation through the outright apportioning of commission’s seats on the basis of criteria relating to ethnicity, political or other type of affiliation. However, selection bodies that are designed to secure wide representation are themselves at risk of having a skewed membership whereby technical expertise in the core areas of work of a commission is secondary to types of affiliation. In such circumstances there are few reasons to expect these bodies to make their selection primarily on the basis of technical expertise. 74 60. Emphasizing the representativeness of commissioners, their capacity to act as “stand-ins” for particular groups, or the appeal of particular individuals to a multiplicity of groups may not always serve a commission well. This is the case when records of some of these persons raise questions of conflict of interest given their connection with events or represented groups that the commission is likely to investigate; when the candidates’ intergroup appeal translates to unwillingness to take strong stands; or when they simply lack the technical capacity to make real contributions. Against this background, the Special Rapporteur calls for the development of international guidelines on incompatibilities, conflicts of interest, and moral fitness of individuals serving in truth commissions. 71 72 73 74 Seven members (five men, two women), see, on the selection procedure, UNTAET/REG/2001/10 (fn 35), section 4. Seven members (four men, three women), see TJRC Act of Kenya (fn 38), clauses 9, 10, and first schedule. Imposing narrow deadlines on consultative procedures defeats part of the purpose of establishing them in the first place, see TJRC Act of Kenya (fn 38), first schedule. The fact that selection panels are not responsible for appointments but merely for recommendations also weakens the incentive to think about their selections in a way that would, at least jointly, cover the required technical competencies; they have no reason to think what a group of commissioners would look like from a technical perspective for the panels do not determine the composition of the commission as a whole. 17