A/HRC/24/42 good reasons behind the continued trend not to make commissions responsible for their implementation.53 45. In addition to the four core functions, truth commissions have been attributed additional functions, including contributing to prosecutorial efforts, either by providing information they gather (for example in Argentina)54 or, as in the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru, by actively constructing cases to be presented to prosecuting authorities.55 46. It is thus a misperception that most truth commissions have been created as substitutes for criminal justice and that they are closely related to amnesties either as one of their characteristic functions or as an indirect consequence. Most commissions have had no relationship with amnesties. Even in the oft-mentioned South African case of “truth in exchange for amnesty”, the relation was complex. The amnesty for which those who provided testimony could apply, or remain liable to prosecution was (a) conditional on the crimes committed having been “political” and on full disclosure and (b) granted or denied by a subcommittee of the commission which was independent from the one receiving the testimony.56 Indeed, most of those who provided testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had their applications for amnesty turned down.57 47. Another function truth commissions have increasingly been given relates to reconciliation. The Special Rapporteur reiterates that there are no shortcuts to reconciliation, and in particular, that meaningful reconciliation requires, in addition to truth, the implementation of the remaining three elements: justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.58 Thus truth commissions on their own cannot achieve reconciliation, and the inclusion of the term in their titles likely generates expectations that cannot be satisfied. 48. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur is concerned about the inclusion of victimperpetrator pardon mechanisms in two recent draft laws on truth commissions. Although the legal consequences of such mechanisms are presently unclear, they risk undermining the realization of international obligations to prosecute. These proposed pardon mechanisms, ostensibly an aspect of reconciliation, misunderstand its nature, especially when the procedures can be initiated without a request from victims. In circumstances of continuing significant power asymmetries between perpetrators and victims and the ongoing security concerns of the latter, forcing victims to participate in procedures that bring them face to face with those who are presumably responsible for the violations they suffered imposes huge burdens on them and exposes them to great risk. Additionally, it raises serious questions about the voluntary nature of the pardons that may flow from such procedures.59 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 14 Despite this, Tunisia is presently considering a draft law creating a commission with the responsibility to also implement reparations programmes (see A/HRC/24/42/Add.1, para. 37). Chile’s TRC was barred from making attributions of responsibility – that function was reserved to judicial authorities – but this did not prevent it, in accordance with its mandate, from referring evidence of criminality to courts. The Commission on Truth for El Salvador refrained from pushing for prosecutions, not because it did not find sufficient prima facie evidence of violations, nor because it thought prosecutions in any way undesirable, but because it did not trust Salvadoran courts at the time to be capable of carrying out fair trials, see Hayner (fn 21), p. 49. The TRC of Peru constructed 47 such cases, see Final Report (fn 39), vol. VII, chap. 2. Progress on these cases, however, has been slow. South African Act 95-34 (fn 34), ch. 4. Subsequent prosecutions have been scant, however. A/HRC/21/46, paras. 36-39. See A/HRC/22/67 and Corrs. 1 and 2, communication to Nepal (22 October 2012).