A/HRC/24/42 73. If commission mandates continue with the aforementioned expanded scope (something about which the Special Rapporteur reiterates his reservations), and the implementation of their recommendations by government agencies is to improve, then the competency of truth commissions in framing recommendations must improve. To this end, commissions will need to learn how to generate budgets and plans for their recommendations and increase their familiarity with how these relate to sectoral reform projects and development plans. They will need to engage earlier with different government agencies and development agents regarding the articulation of their recommendations in actionable ways. Similarly, it is critical for commissions to establish close relationships with civil society. In the end, the fate of recommendations depends to a large extent on the leadership, advocacy and persistence of civil society organizations. 74. By the same token, the Special Rapporteur calls on the international community, donors included, to examine their patterns of support – technical, financial, political – for truth commissions. He is concerned that as conflict wanes, but long before transformation is completed, support frequently wavers. Neither the cessation of conflict, nor the end of a truth commission’s duration, is reason for support to diminish, as the implementation of recommendations depends significantly on continued support. (b) Follow-up to recommendations 75. Some cases demonstrate an attempt to “short cut” the problem of implementation by declaring in the mandates that the commissions’ recommendations are legally binding. This includes those of Sierra Leone85 and Liberia.86 However, such attempted short cuts raise serious constitutional questions regarding the separation of powers, as commissions cannot order Parliament to enact certain laws, impose policies on the executive, or demand that prosecutors pursue particular cases and that courts hear them.87 The more far-reaching the recommendations are, the more they deal with issues that in democratic countries should be the subject of political contestation. Moreover, as empirical evidence demonstrates, proclaiming recommendations obligatory offers no guarantee for their implementation. 76. Over time, three different institutional solutions for follow up have been tried: (a) the creation of purpose-specific, stand-alone bodies, as witnessed in Chile88 and proposed in Peru;89 (b) the establishment of functional units within existing ministries, as observed in 85 86 87 88 89 The mandate of Sierra Leone’s TRC states that “the Government shall faithfully and timeously implement the recommendations of the report that are directed to state bodies and encourage or facilitate the implementation of any recommendations that may be directed to others”, see The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXXI, No. 9, 10 February 2000, part V, art. 17. The Act that established Liberia’s TRC (fn 37) stipulates succinctly, “All recommendations shall be implemented,” section 48. The Liberian Supreme Court struck down article 48 of the TRC Act which made it mandatory for the government to implement the Commission’s recommendations. The Court concluded that the article usurped the powers of other branches of government which was not authorized by the constitution, see Williams v. Minister of Justice, Attorney General, Independent National Human Rights Commission and Government of Liberia, Supreme Court of the Republic of Liberia, 21 January 2011; available at: www.mediafire.com/?u1n6zkqoxl1zn3o. For example, Chile’s Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación is an example of a standalone institution created specifically to complete the fact-finding, victim-tracing, and the reparation functions described in the mandate of the TRC. Peru’s TRC recommended the establishment of a temporary interministerial working group and a permanent autonomous body (Consejo Nacional de Reconciliación) attached to the presidency of the council of ministers, which would have as its responsibilities to coordinate national policies implementing the TRC’s recommendations, and to prepare draft bills that the executive could present 21