A/HRC/43/45/Add.1 revenue mostly consists of funds from the Special Tax on Hydrocarbons and its Derivatives and royalties collected by the central Government, whereas municipal governments obtain the bulk of their revenue from national taxes (fiscal co-participation) and direct taxes on hydrocarbons. While municipal governments are able to collect some municipal taxes, such as taxes on rural property, urban real estate, vehicles, and transactions of these goods, they often do not have sufficient capacity to collect taxes, and the contribution of municipal taxes to the total revenue is rather insignificant.90 45. The main factors that determine the allocation of revenue to subnational governments is hydrocarbon production and population size. While the hydrocarbons tax revenue is distributed more or less equally among the producing and non-producing departments (with the exception of Tarija), only the four hydrocarbon-producing departments of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Tarija and Santa Cruz receive royalties according to their level of production, and two non-producing departments, Beni and Pando, which are also the most remote departments, receive a small portion as “less favoured” regions.91 The three most populous departments, La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, also receive allocations from a compensation fund, sourced from the hydrocarbons tax revenue. This formula gives rise to an uneven and unequal distribution of resources, whereby the producing department of Tarija receives one of the largest shares, despite its relatively small population size.92 While the departments with a larger population size, such as La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, receive larger shares of the pie compared to other departments, they receive the smallest amounts of resources per capita.93 The formula does not take into account the different departments’ requirements in terms of resources to reduce poverty and inequality and to improve other human development indicators. As emphasized under principle 4 of the guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of economic reforms, the central Government should implement appropriate crossgovernment coordination mechanisms and processes, so that subnational governments have the necessary resources to fulfil their human rights obligations (A/HRC/40/57, para. 4.2). The ongoing negotiations on the fiscal pact should take into consideration the scale of the challenges that each department and municipality faces in terms of poverty alleviation when determining the allocation of fiscal resources from the central Government. G. Limited transparency and access to information 46. The principle of participation is a fundamental pillar of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and the 2009 Constitution firmly guarantees the right of the people to participate in the design of public policies and the administration of public fiscal resources (art. 241). The right to participate is inextricably linked to the right of access to information, as informed and meaningful participation is not possible without the appropriate information. Article 21 of the Constitution thus also guarantees the right of access to information. 47. However, there are some signs that the principle of participation has been limited in some cases, as necessary information to participate in public policymaking has not been readily available. A lack of access to information has been observed in a variety of cases, ranging from macroeconomic policymaking to the planning of infrastructure projects. In particular, some stakeholders pointed out that data and figures on important indicators may not be available publicly or in a timely manner, or that, in many cases of infrastructure projects, information relating to the projects, conditions for loan approval and any environmental and social impact assessment carried out are not publicly disclosed, rendering the stakeholders’ participation in decision-making futile.94 There are a number of 90 91 92 93 94 Lykke E. Andersen and Luis Carlos Jemio, “Decentralization and poverty reduction in Bolivia: challenges and opportunities”, Development Research Working Paper Series, No. 01/2016 (La Paz, Institute for Advanced Development Studies, 2016), p. 9. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., pp. 11–12. See, for example, Fundación Solón, “Megahidroeléctricas, ¿energía limpia o negocio sucio?”, Tunupa, No. 107 (December 2018); Plataforma Energética, “La ruta de la presencia china en 15