A/HRC/23/58 Government communities, these self-defence forces were systematically engaged in combat operations alongside army units. 23. Recently, Hizbullah fighters are openly supporting the Syrian military during operations conducted near Al Qusayr along the Lebanese border, while members of the General Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have done the same around Yarmouk camp in Damascus. 2. Anti-government armed groups 24. Anti-government armed groups have reinforced their control over regions seized in the northern and eastern governorates, but failed to push further into the key areas of Damascus, Aleppo and Homs. Lacking unity of command, operational discipline and logistical support, they have struggled when facing Government strongholds, where fighting has largely stalemated. 25. The Supreme Joint Military Command Council, created to ensure unity of command at the national level, has failed to centralize different sources of logistical support, integrate command networks and alleviate the influence of radical groups. The inability to support its units logistically has undermined the Council’s attempts to unite the armed groups under its authority. 26. Anti-government armed groups have also conducted sporadic shelling of proGovernment areas such as Fou’a (Idlib), and imposed a tight siege on pro-Government villages in northern governorates, such as the Shia localities of Nubul and Zahra in Aleppo. 27. The rise in Government-supported minority militia and the positioning by both sides of bases within their respective supportive communities has fostered hostilities along sectarian lines. Provocative rhetoric, such as recent statements by the spokesperson of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), risks inciting mass, indiscriminate violence against minority communities. 28. Armed groups are still equipped mainly with small arms and light weapons, but there has been an increase in the use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, as well as indirect fire assets, provided predominantly by supporting countries and armed groups in the region. They used mortars and artillery guns to target army positions, but also proGovernment localities, usually those hosting army positions. 29. The ongoing violence has accelerated radicalization among anti-government fighters, allowing radical groups, in particular Jabhat Al-Nusra (also known as the Al-Nusra Front), to become more influential. Jabhat Al-Nusra has been part of, and occasionally coleads, most major operations conducted by other anti-government armed groups given its better organization and discipline, greater operational efficiency and access to external support. Since the announcement of ties with the Iraqi wing of Al-Qaida, there appears to be growing support for the group from regional extremist groups providing recruits and equipment. Foreign fighters with jihadist inclinations, many from neighbouring countries, continued to reinforce its ranks. Tensions and clashes emerged over governance and authority matters between Jabhat Al-Nusra and local groups. 30. Other radical groups consolidated alliances that engage in significant combat operations in the north and around Damascus. With no permanent affiliation to the Supreme Joint Military Command Council, alliances such as the Syrian Islamic Front and the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front have developed their own governance structures, including security, political and judicial mechanisms. 7