A/HRC/33/29 search and browsing, may deter individuals from accessing information, particularly where such surveillance leads to repressive outcomes.72 57. As affirmed by the General Assembly73 and the Human Rights Council,74 rights enjoyed offline must also be protected online, including the right to privacy. While the right to privacy is not an absolute right, it must be protected against unlawful or arbitrary interference.75 For an interference to be in line with international human rights law, the national law allowing it must be sufficiently accessible, clear and precise so that an individual may look to the law and ascertain who is authorized to conduct surveillance and under what circumstances.76 Surveillance must be based on reasonable suspicion, and any order authorizing it must be sufficiently targeted.77 Surveillance programmes frequently fail this requirement.78 Prior judicial authorization and effective independent oversight during and after surveillance are additional important safeguards against arbitrariness. 79 58. The General Assembly80 and OHCHR81 have called upon all States to review their procedures, practices and legislation related to communications surveillance, interception and collection of personal data, emphasizing the need for States to ensure the full and effective implementation of their obligations under international human rights law.82 As also highlighted by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, mass secret surveillance is not permissible under international human rights law, as an individualized necessity and proportionality analysis would not be possible in the context of such measures.83 59. As previously noted, there is strong evidence of growing reliance by States on the private sector to conduct and facilitate digital surveillance, using both formal legal mechanisms and covert mechanisms to gain access to content and metadata. Companies that provide mass and targeted surveillance technologies without adequate safeguards are of particular concern, in particular because such technologies may be used to silence dissidents.84 The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression warned that it is all too common for private companies to censor, conduct surveillance, or enforce other restrictions on freedom of expression, often under pressure from Governments, but sometimes on their own initiative. 85 The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which were endorsed by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 17/4, provide an important framework for the consideration 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 See A/HRC/29/32, para. 21. General Assembly resolutions 68/167 and 69/166. Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and 26/13. See A/HRC/27/37, paras. 22-23; see also A/HRC/13/37, para. 17. See A/HRC/27/37, para. 23. See European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Zakharov v. Russia (4 December 2015), para. 248; European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary, (12 January 2016), para. 77; and CCPR/C/NZL/CO/6, para. 16. See A/69/397, para. 37; and A/HRC/27/37. See A/HRC/14/46, para. 34. General Assembly resolutions 68/167 and 69/166. See A/HRC/27/37, para. 50. See A/69/397, para. 31. See See A/HRC/27/37, para. 25; and A/69/397, para. 47. Reporters without Borders, “Enemies of the Internet: 2013 report – special edition: surveillance”, introduction (“Era of the digital mercenaries”). A/HRC/32/38; and www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20115&LangID=E. 17