A/HRC/22/41 48. A number of delegations stated their view that it was premature to consider negotiations on a legally binding instrument at this stage. They noted the need to reinforce existing PMSC-specific initiatives, namely the Montreux Document and International Code of Conduct, and to carefully assess their impact, before embarking on new initiatives which might divert attention and resources, and result in a convention with only a few ratifications. A “one size fits all” convention might also unduly affect PMSCs whose activities do not require international regulation, such as companies providing ordinary security functions in a domestic setting. Some delegations expressed concerned that the Human Rights Council might overstep its mandate in developing a convention that would also address aspects of international humanitarian law and international criminal law, in addition to international human rights law. 49. One delegation advocated a step-by-step approach focused on first reaching substantive agreement on different areas before committing to a specific form of regulatory framework. D. Accountability for human rights violations/abuses of private military and security companies 50. The fifth meeting of the second session was dedicated to the discussion of accountability for PMSC-related human rights violations in national legislation, as well as the perspective of victims of such violations. 1. States with national legislation 51. The United States of America indicated that PMSCs and their activities were regulated in the United States by a web of interlocking provisions. Law in the United States prohibited contracting PMSCs for the performance of inherently governmental functions. Laws controlling the export of defence articles or defence services, such as weapons and military training, also applied to PMSCs. Carefully worded provisions in government contracts concluded with PMSCs concern selection and vetting of personnel, training, and standards of conduct. Breaches of contract could lead to a variety of consequences, including performance-based deductions, non-extension or termination of contract or debarment from future tenders. In addition, PMSC staff could be held criminally accountable under certain circumstances for offenses committed outside U.S. territory under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and Uniform Code of Criminal Justice. A Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act bill had been introduced in the Senate to expand and clarify extraterritorial jurisdiction over federal contractors. That bill was pending. State common law and federal statutes in the United States also allowed for private parties to bring suit against PMSCs. 52. Switzerland stated that draft legislation had been developed, which would require PMSCs registered in Switzerland to notify the Swiss authorities about their activities abroad and prohibit certain activities by PMSCs, such as directly participating in hostilities. Violations could result in criminal sanctions, including imprisonment. The draft law also directed the Government only to contract PMSCs that had signed the International Code of Conduct. 53. The United Kingdom stated that it had a variety of domestic legislation relevant to the activities of PMSCs, whether at home or abroad. The United Kingdom did not have legislation on what governmental functions could be outsourced. However, there was an understanding that military activity would only be undertaken by military personnel under the command of a commissioned officer. The United Kingdom considered a certification system based on industry-specific standards the most effective way to address human rights 12