A/HRC/22/41 although there were indications of strong disapproval of the involvement of private actors in combat activities, there was no clear international prohibition. Second, while it is clear that States had the general international obligation to ensure respect for humanitarian law and human rights vis-à-vis PMSCs, the content of such obligations has not been explicated. While the Working Group has consistently encouraged States to adopt national legislation to regulate PMSCs and believed such regulation to be essential, it seemed unlikely that ad hoc efforts alone would be successful. Because PMSCs operate transnationally, it was not enough if only a few countries adopted legislation regulating their activities. 17. Regarding self-regulation initiatives, she noted that the International Code of Conduct constituted one element of an international system to meet the challenges of regulating PMSCs, but was by itself clearly insufficient to ensure comprehensive accountability for violations of human rights and to provide remedies to victims. With regard to the draft charter, she noted that the Working Group was of the view that the draft did not live up to the aspirations of the Code and does not conform to the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. She noted that an inductive approach, whereby an international convention was developed on the basis of good national legislation adopted by several countries might be viable approach. She also noted that the good practices outlined in the Montreux Document provided a good basis, but that certain issues such as PMSCs activities outside of armed conflict as well as the treatment of third party nationals were not covered by it. 18. In the subsequent discussion, one delegation noted that currently 42 States and one international organization (the European Union) support the Montreux Document, while 464 companies had signed on the International Code of Conduct, respectively. The delegation also referred to the ongoing development of a draft charter for the oversight mechanism of the International Code of Conduct. 19. Another delegation stated that existing challenges could be attributed to gaps in international law, especially a failure to place limits on the types of activities that PMSCs might carry out and the regulation of their transnational activities outside their home States. Another delegation expressed support for stronger control of PMSCs, especially concerning their transnational activities. 20. The representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that while international humanitarian law prohibited the outsourcing of certain activities to PSMCs, such as the command of prisoner of war camps and civilian internment camps, as well as the exercise of an occupying power, it did not explicitly prohibit the direct participation of any private persons in hostilities. However, on humanitarian reasons, in particular to maintain the distinction between civilians and combatants, and because civilian private contractors typically operated outside the chain of command, the ICRC concurred that PSMCs should not be contracted to directly participate in hostilities as long as they are not part of the armed forces. The ICRC also indicated that serious implementation and accountability problems remained due to the unwillingness or inability of States to uphold or enforce existing obligations, including by implementing the good practices set out in the Montreux Document. B. Definition, scope and nature of private military and security companies and related challenges for member States, in particular with regard to extraterritorial activities of PMSCs 21. Stuart Groves focused his presentation on the ongoing process within the United Nations to adopt clear criteria for its use of armed private security companies. He noted that, under the policy being developed, the United Nations would not contract with 6