A/HRC/42/36 accountability, a delegation questioned whether compliance mechanisms would be national or international and, in the event of an international mechanism, whether it would then be necessary for private military and security companies to ratify the treaty giving rise to the mechanism. 70. A delegation shared its understanding that private military and security companies would be bound by international humanitarian law in instances where they qualified as parties to a conflict, and noted that there was an ongoing debate on whether private military and security companies, as non-State actors, have human rights obligations under international law. It further stated that it understood element 8 as setting forth guidelines on the requirements that private military and security companies themselves needed to fulfil. 71. A delegation stressed the importance of training programmes for private military and security companies’ personnel. In that regard, it suggested that international humanitarian law training should be mandatory as well as the passing of examinations before receiving government certification. It urged States to consider limiting the number of private military and security company personnel in the territory of a party to a conflict in order to prevent States from using contracts with private military and security companies to enhance their combat potential or hide their military presence in the territory of another State. One participant, seconded by another, stated that all training should be adapted to the environment in which companies would operate and that it should be ongoing to allow for the continuous improvement of the conduct of private military and security companies. 72. On the issue of compliance mechanisms, a participant stressed that they needed to be robust and completed with human rights indicators and metrics that could assist in identifying gaps and areas where improvement was needed. Three delegations emphasized that the working group should resist the temptation to discuss in detail the internal regulations of private military and security companies in order to avoid giving the impression that it intended to involve itself too deeply in the internal affairs of businesses. 73. A participant stressed the need to ensure that grievance mechanisms were accessible and provided effective remedies for victims. To that end, it was essential to state clearly where those mechanisms were situated in the supply chain and who had the responsibility to ensure that victims could access a mechanism at the appropriate level to have their grievances effectively addressed. A delegation suggested that the working group look at the accountability and remedy project of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 4 which provides examples of State and non-State accountability processes compiled as a result of a multi-stakeholder process. A delegation expressed support for the idea of establishing a grievance mechanism and proposed that the language establishing it reflect the international human rights language adopted by the Human Rights Council, which traditionally refers to “review” or “monitoring” mechanisms. It considered that such an approach would better reflect the way the mechanisms would work, with the State being reviewed for compliance rather than the private military and security companies. It also requested the deletion of the word “compliance” and requested language more in line with what had already been used by the treaty bodies, such as “review/followup”. 74. A delegation suggested that the working group should discuss whether to restrict the activities of private military and security companies’ personnel within certain territories under element 8. Definitions and interpretations (element 1) 1 (a) Private military and security companies; 1 (b) Private security companies; 1 (c) Private military companies; 4 See www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OHCHRaccountabilityandremedyproject.aspx. 13