A/HRC/42/36 self-regulatory systems” in the discussion document might discourage States from establishing such systems. Another participant suggested replacing the end of 3 (c) with “concern about the effectiveness of existing regulatory systems”. 45. It was pointed out that the principles of transparency and integrity should be delinked from the question of integrity of voluntary or self-regulatory systems. The principle of transparency should be applied to the whole supply chain, including subcontractors, and not only to private military and security companies. 46. Several participants also questioned the inclusion of affordability in the list of principles. A participant insisted that certification requirements must be proportionate to operational need in order to attract small and medium-size enterprises, which were often concerned about the cost implications of joining an international certification process. Another participant, while agreeing that the term “affordability” should be removed, highlighted that it was important to reach out to small and medium-size companies as they represented a substantial proportion of the private security industry. Both participants were invited to propose a formulation that would address the concerns expressed about small and medium-size enterprises. 47. One delegation stressed that the regulatory framework should remain as attractive as possible by not creating further responsibilities for States. It also pointed out that in conflict situations, international humanitarian law applies pursuant to the lex specialis principle. Yet, international humanitarian law does not refer to private military and security companies but rather to organized armed groups. That was a question that should be taken into consideration in the preparation of the international regulatory framework. Contracting States (element 4) 4 (a) Determine which military/security services the State may not contract for; 4 (b) Establish a private security company and private military company procurement process that incorporates an assessment of a company’s capacity to perform services in conformity with the law, including robust criteria for the selection of the company; 4 (c) Incorporate requirements into government contracts to ensure respect for national law, human rights law and applicable international humanitarian law, including providing relevant guidance; 4 (d) Monitor and ensure accountability, including by addressing issues of jurisdiction and immunities, for companies operating under a government contract. 48. One delegation stressed that private military and security companies should not be used for military activities and should focus on performing auxiliary security activities instead. A participant recalled that international humanitarian law prohibits States from contracting out a number of functions to private military and security companies, including the management of prisoner of war camps. Another delegation referred to its national legislation, which specifies which tasks State authorities can subcontract and what requirements subcontractors should meet in terms of recruitment and training of personnel. 49. A delegation suggested that there was a need to distinguish between situations of armed conflict and situations where there was no armed conflict. In response, it was suggested that separate bullet points for each of those scenarios be included. That delegation further proposed defining the services first, followed by language distinguishing what services a State may not contract for in situations of armed conflict and situations without an armed conflict. 50. Many delegations noted the importance of differentiating between companies that provided military and security services. Other delegations, however, supported an approach 9