A/HRC/17/44 51. Peacetime Libya: Before the demonstrations began in mid-February, Libya could be classified as being in a normal state of peace. 52. Non-international armed conflict: The precise date for determining when this change from peace to non-international armed conflict occurred is somewhat difficult in the current circumstances. The Commission notes that other organizations that have been examining this question such as the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have not put forward a particular date.43 53. The Commission notes the definition of non-international armed conflicts in Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims in Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II) (to which the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a party), namely conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol”. The situation must constitute more than either isolated acts of violence or a mere internal disturbance or riot and involve protracted violence, engaging both the Government forces and an organized armed group. No definition of non-international armed conflict is provided for in the four Geneva conventions (which includes the provisions of common article 3). Jurisprudence has developed, however, defining non-international armed conflict as whenever there is “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”.44 54. In determining whether a non-international armed conflict exists, the Commission has thus had to consider the intensity of the conflict, the extent of relevant control of territory and the nature of the armed group in opposition to the Government. Examining the nature of the armed group involves considering such factors as whether there is a hierarchical command structure, the extent to which it is able to carry out organized operations (e.g. organizes into zones of responsibility, means of communication); discipline systems; the nature of logistical arrangements; and how the group presents itself (e.g. whether it is capable of involvement in negotiations). 55. Information on the intensity of the conflict and how the opposition forces have gained territorial control is more readily available than on many aspects of the organization of the armed opposition forces. On 19 February, Government opponents assumed control over the Katiba premises in Benghazi45 and took control of the airport there. On the same day in Tobruk, Government opponents took over Omar al-Mukhtar Katiba and confiscated weaponry. On 20 February, demonstrators controlled the town of Shahat, in the east of Libya and reportedly “arrested” persons fighting with the Qadhafi forces. By 24 February, anti-Government forces appear to have taken control of Tobruk and Misrata. On 26 February, Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) welcomed various institutions‟ condemnation of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Libya 43 44 45 18 The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in his report to the Security Council, for instance, referred to there being an armed conflict in Libya “since the end of February”, see International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, “First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)” (2011), para. 37. Jakob Kellenberger, President of ICRC, stated on 10 March 2011 that a non-international armed conflict existed in Libya but without stipulating the commencement date. See ICRC, “Libya: urgent to apply the rules of war” News Release 11/53, 10 March 2011. Prosecutor v Tadic, Jurisdiction Decision, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 70. A similar formulation was adopted in the Rome Statute (art. 8, para. 2 (f)). This was the Al Fadhil bin Omar Katiba premises, the major such premise in Benghazi.