A/HRC/4/20 page 30 126 A/55/40, para. 13 (2000) (Kuwait). 127 CCPR/C/79/Add.116, para. 14 (1999) (Cameroon). 128 CCPR/C/79/Add.23, para. 8 (1993) (Egypt). 129 CCPR/CO/71/SYR/Add.1, para. 9 (2001) (Syrian Arab Republic); CCPR/CO/72/PRK, para. 13 (2001) (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); CCPR/C/79/Add.101, para. 8 (1998) (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). 130 HRC, General Comment 6 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Baboeram et al. v. Suriname, Communication No. 146/1983 and 148 to 154/1983 (1985), para. 14. 131 In a series of communications concerning the extradition of persons to a country in which they could face the death penalty, the HRC evaluated whether extradition would expose the communication’s author “to a real risk of a violation of Article 6, paragraph 2 [of the ICCPR]” in the destination country, and it did not find a violation where the crime in question was murder. Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, para. 14.3 (1993) (no violation where extradition was for “premeditated murder, undoubtedly a very serious crime”); Chitat Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, para. 15.3 (1994) (“The Committee notes that Mr. Ng was extradited to stand trial on 19 criminal charges, including 12 counts of murder. If sentenced to death, that sentence, based on the information which the Committee has before it, would be based on a conviction of guilt in respect of very serious crimes.”); Cox v. Canada, Communication No. 539/1993, para. 16.2 (1994) (no violation where extradition was for “complicity in two murders, undoubtedly very serious crimes”). See also Roger Judge v. Canada, Communication No. 829/1998 (2003) (finding extradition to violate ICCPR, art. 6 where extraditing country had abolished the death penalty, regardless whether extradition was on a most serious crime). 132 This has been stated explicitly in the concluding observations on some country reports. See CCPR/C/79/Add.25, para. 8 (1993) (Islamic Republic of Iran) (“In the light of the provision of article 6 of the Covenant, requiring States parties that have not abolished the death penalty to limit it to the most serious crimes, the Committee considers the imposition of that penalty … for crimes that do not result in loss of life, as being contrary to the Covenant.”); CCPR/CO/83/KEN, para. 13 (2005) (Kenya) (“[T]he Committee notes with concern … that the death penalty applies to crimes not having fatal or similarly grave consequences, such as robbery with violence or attempted robbery with violence, which do not qualify as ‘most serious crimes’ within the meaning of article 6, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.”) 133 Thompson v. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Communication No. 806/1998 (2000), para. 8.2-3. See also E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3, para. 21: “The notion of most serious crimes was later developed in the Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, according to which the most serious crimes are those ‘intentional crimes with lethal or other extremely grave consequences’. The Special Rapporteur considers that the term ‘intentional’ should be equated to premeditation and should be understood as deliberate intention to kill.”