A/HRC/28/59 regime remains in power, there remains a greater risk that such a regime will engage in systematic suppression. 46. Preliminary empirical evidence shows that foreign financial sources might have an important impact on the durability of authoritarian regimes in power. 34 The authors of the study in question consider whether net transfers of public and publicly guaranteed external debt have an impact on the likelihood that an authoritarian regime transitions to democracy during the same year, using data covering the period 1970–2006.35 The analysis is based on a data set capturing 158 different episodes of authoritarian rule in 91 countries. 47. The results show the negative impact over a period of 36 years that foreign debt has had on the likelihood of a transition to democracy.36 While more research is needed and the preliminary results should be interpreted with caution, the effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. They suggest that foreign loans contribute to the perpetuation of authoritarian regimes. While the gross probability of a transition to democracy (within one year) in the sample is 2.2 per cent, moving from the minimum to the maximum value of the debt variable brings about a 1.65 per cent (per year) decrease in the probability of democratization (then reaching 0.3–0.4 per cent).37 Over a 10-year period, for example, the effect would obviously be higher. The data set would predict that, on average, 22 per cent of all authoritarian regimes not benefitting from public or private lending would transition to democratic governance. However of those regimes regularly receiving net public or private lending, only 3.35 per cent would become democratically ruled. Some additional tests also reveal that foreign borrowing might be of special relevance in times of economic downturn, which usually lead to severe shrinkages in State revenues. 48. Rerunning the regime survival model detailed above, but distinguishing between net transfers on external debt (public and publicly guaranteed external debt) from official creditors and those from private lenders, it is possible to observe the impact of foreign debt provided by private and official creditors on the likelihood of democratization.38 49. The results suggest that, although both sources of funds have helped authoritarian regimes endure, loans from private creditors have actually been more likely to stabilize authoritarian regimes than official lending and thus are probably also more harmful to human rights.39 Additional research is needed to establish whether funds provided to authoritarian regimes are used to buy loyalties through patronage (thus prolonging the life of the regime), or are used to boost the repressive apparatus of the regime. 50. The different impact of official and private lending might partially be explained by the fact that official creditors, in particular bilateral lenders, may be subject to some (although frequently limited) political accountability. As most of the world’s large bilateral lenders enjoy some form of democratic governance, voters and civil society might resent their Governments using taxpayers’ money to support States violating fundamental human rights. Similarly, albeit frequently criticized for their lack of transparency and democratic 34 35 36 37 38 39 See Bohoslavsky and Escribà-Folch, “Rational choice and financial complicity with human rights abuses: policy and legal implications” in Making Sovereign Financing and Human Rights Work. Measured in constant (2000) dollars per capita. Data compiled from the World Bank World Development Indicators. To estimate those probabilities, the other variables have been held constant at their means. The results remain largely unaltered if one controls for trade (imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP). See Bohoslavsky and Escribà-Folch “Rational choice and financial complicity with human rights abuses: policy and legal implications” in Making Sovereign Financing and Human Rights Work. Ibid. 15