A/HRC/28/59 1979, the ways in which different rights violations are interlinked is often part of the survival strategy of a regime.42 Foreign investors may benefit from the failure of a regime to respect human rights, such as the right to freedom of association and to form trade unions, or from countries with weak social, safety and health standards. If foreign actors make decisions based on profitability, and profitability is more likely to be higher when human rights are restrained, then economic assistance can contribute to the perpetuation of human rights abuses and such abuses, in turn, might potentially bring about the necessary conditions to attract and obtain additional economic assistance or investment. Moreover, a set of practices that have pernicious consequences for development may be part of the legacy of an authoritarian regime in the transition to democracy and the economic structures created under authoritarianism will influence the prospects for consolidating democracy. 43 56. The present report has not dealt with the legal aspects of financial complicity in human rights, or international or national law. The purpose of the report is to provoke discussion and to obtain feedback from stakeholders, to be able to assess the robustness of the framework and data provided, stimulate further data collection and determine how measurement methods and theoretical arguments could be improved accordingly. The Independent Expert intends to present a future report with a legal analysis of financial complicity and policy guidance as to how States and private financial actors should deal with the issue. He hopes that in a future report, he will also be able to present a revised analysis incorporating a direct statistical check between net lending and gross violations of human rights, although there are certain methodological challenges that need to be addressed in that respect. 57. The aim of the Independent Expert is to increase political and institutional interest in developing adequate guidance and policies that should assist States, multilateral institutions and private actors to make better and more informed decisions as to whether or not they should lend to Governments suspected of committing gross violations of human rights. Should decisions be made to lend to States or State institutions with questionable human rights records, such guidance should also specify how lending could be implemented to minimize the risk that it will contribute to gross violations of human rights or international crimes. The Independent Expert also intends to discuss in a future report whether the development of additional legal standards is required to address the issue. That includes clarifying to what extent lenders might be held responsible for financial complicity and how victims might enjoy access to remedies. 42 43 Antonio Cassese, “Foreign economic assistance and respect for civil and political rights: Chile a case study,” Texas International Law Journal, vol. 14, No. 2 (1979). See Tony Addison, “The political economy of the transition from authoritarianism,” in Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections, Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds. (New York, Social Science Research Council, 2009); and, generally, Justice and Economic Violence in Transition, Dustin Sharp, ed. (New York, Springer Publications, 2014). 17