A/HRC/34/47 67. The third panellist presented the work and experience of ILO, focusing on three types of instruments, namely, international labour standards, fundamental principles and rights at work and the Tripartite Declaration. 68. The fourth panellist referred to the rapid growth of corporate social responsibility and sustainability and noted the still limited legislation regulating transnational corporations and the general opposition of corporations to such legislation. 69. The fifth panellist stated that there was no legal obstacle to international law imposing obligations and responsibilities on private non-State actors. He provided examples of several treaties and other instruments that did so, including the Guiding Principles. He agreed that States could impose direct obligations on non-State actors in a treaty, in addition to the obligations imposed on States themselves. That would make it easier for victims to seek remedy without the help of State agencies and to negotiate out-ofcourt settlements. 70. One delegation mentioned the existence of regional instruments, such as the Charter of the Organization of American States (art. 36), in which general principles on the responsibility of businesses were recognized. 71. Another delegation noted that there was no comprehensive international instrument addressing global corporate accountability, leaving the door open to a legal vacuum and potential violations. Moreover, voluntary mechanisms could not be compared to legally binding rules that recognized transnational corporations and other business enterprises as bearers of direct human rights obligations. 72. Another delegation described how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights imposed obligations to respect human rights on all actors of society, including transnational corporations. The legally binding instrument proposed must include provisions to protect public services of common interest, for example provisions relating to the right to water and respect for mother earth; provisions to protect individual and collective human rights, including the rights of peasants; and a monitoring mechanism. 73. According to another delegation, national systems of justice were experiencing challenges in preventing transnational corporations from committing human rights violations, as well as in the areas of prosecuting perpetrators and compensating victims. 74. Another delegation noted that the Tripartite Declaration was weak in human rights language and was currently under review. 75. Several delegations considered that a binding instrument should set out direct responsibilities and obligations for transnational corporations while making clear distinctions between obligations borne by companies and those borne by States. No loopholes should allow transnational corporations to escape their responsibilities, and a mechanism should be established to evaluate corporate due diligence. 76. Many NGOs expressed the view that voluntary principles were not effective in ensuring the regulation of transnational corporations, for example food corporations, with respect to their impact and responsibilities in terms of public health. 77. NGOs submitted that a binding instrument would also need to apply to international financial institutions and banks that provided corporate funding. One NGO drew attention to the so-called Panama Papers, which had revealed that corporations avoided taxes and obtained fiscal benefits to maximize profits, thereby contributing to tax fraud and exacerbating inequality and poverty. 78. It would be important for the working group to replicate article 5 (3) of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control to avoid undue influence from commercial and other vested interests. 13