A/HRC/29/31 F. Revitalizing the equality norm 54. At present, there is no explicitly stated right to equality, as such, under international human rights law. In order to ground equality as an organizing theme in this area of law, 65 human rights bodies and commentators have relied on provisions such as those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that proclaim the equal rights of men and women (preamble), that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights (art. 1) and that all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law” (art. 7).66 These provisions have been paired with those dealing with non-discrimination, which is also considered to be one of the central and foundational principles of international human rights law. Virtually all of the core human rights treaties contain explicit provisions on non-discrimination. Also, for the most part, human rights bodies have been careful to emphasize that the norms of equality and non-discrimination require substantive and not just formal equality. 55. However, in reading the jurisprudence generated by most of the treaty bodies, it is difficult to escape certain conclusions. First, article 3 of the International Covenants on Human Rights, which asserts equal rights for men and women, has perhaps not been given its fullest reading, especially in terms of access to resources. Second, for all of the attention given to affirmative obligations to eliminate discrimination, much of the work of the treaty bodies seems unduly confined to a focus on specific violations of non-discrimination. Linked to this is a reluctance to develop notions of distributive equality, which has been much debated in the literature, and would give an important added dimension to the effort to combat extreme inequality. Third, the right to equality needs to be given greater attention so that it is able to add substantively to the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies in ways that it has not, thus far.67 Finally, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has to date done all too little in practice, as opposed to its analysis in general comments,68 to explore what might be involved in the prohibitions in article 2 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights against discrimination based on social origin, property or birth.69 65 66 67 68 69 18 Equality is such a central principle in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations that some have argued “that its absence would make the landscape of human rights look fundamentally different”. See Jarlath Clifford, “Equality”, in Dinah Shelton, ed., The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford, 2013), p. 431. Some of these formulations were later reflected in the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. More creative approaches, designed to breathe new life into the right to equality, in order to achieve the deeper objectives of the norm and to deal more effectively with the problem of extreme inequality, have been suggested by Sandra Fredman and are deserving of very careful consideration. She argues: “Substantive equality should be developed in a multi-dimensional format, which recognises and addresses the distributional, recognition, structural and exclusive wrongs experienced by out-groups. This yields four main purposes or dimensions of substantive equality: to redress disadvantage; to address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence; to embrace difference and achieve structural change; and to enhance voice and participation.” See Sandra Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 70/2014 (University of Oxford, 2014). Available from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2510287. See general comment No. 20 (2009) on non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights. Ben Saul, David Kinley and Jacqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 192–193.