A/HRC/15/50 no established methods of criminal investigations “such as visits to the crime scene, interviews with witnesses and victims, and assessment by reference to established legal standards”;64 the delay of six months to start some 13 criminal investigations constituted undue delay;65 criminal investigations had been conducted in an unprofessional way, making it virtually impossible to prove charges beyond reasonable doubt;66 and command investigations were generally a tool to review performance and learn lessons, which can hardly be an effective and impartial investigation mechanism to respond to allegations of serious violations.67 Promptness 51. The Committee has reservations as to whether investigations were sufficiently prompt. Promptness requires investigations to commence and progress with reasonable expedition. The Committee notes that many Palestinian witnesses were interviewed only at the very end of 2009, while many allegations of IHL and IHRL violations were reported almost immediately at the end of “Operation Cast Lead” in January 2009 and at the latest in September 2009 with the publication of the FFM report. Such delays can result in evidence being lost or compromised, and in the kind of confusing and conflicting testimony that affected the results of the inquiries into the shooting of Majda and Rayya Hajaj and the attack on the el-Bader flour mill referred to above. Without additional information on when specific investigations actually got under way, the Committee is not in a position to make a definitive finding on the expeditiousness with which Israel conducted the relevant proceedings. Independence and impartiality 52. In general terms, it appears that Israel’s military justice system has certain built-in mechanisms to preserve its independence. At the heart of the system is the MAG, whose hierarchical independence rests on a number of factors. Specifically, the Minister of Defense, rather than the Chief of General Staff, is responsible for his appointment and decisions of the MAG are subject to review by the Attorney-General and by the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, including through petition by individuals and civil society. Israeli jurisprudence illustrates the careful attention paid to ensuring the independent functioning of the MAG within the rule of law.68 53. In spite of the structural guarantees of independence built into the military justice system, the dual responsibilities of the MAG, in the specific context of these investigations, raise concerns of a lack of impartiality. The MAG is legal adviser to the Chief of Staff and other military authorities. Yet, at the same time, he is the supervisor of disciplinary law in the military. Although the combination of the advisory and supervisory functions in one office does not automatically lead to a conflict of interest or a lack of impartiality, the situation is complicated in the present case by the fact that many of the allegations of 64 65 66 67 68 Ibid., para. 1819. Ibid., para. 1820. Ibid., para. 1829. Ibid., para. 1831. See, e.g., HCJ 4723/96, Avivit Atiyah v. Attorney-General 51(3) P.D. 714; HCJ 425/89, Jamal Abdel Kader Mahmoud v. the Chief Military Prosecutor, 43(4) P.D. 718; HCJ 372/88, Fuchs v. the Military Advocate General, 42(3) P.D. 154; HCJ 425/89, Zofan v. the Military Advocate General 43(4) P.D. 718; Cr.A. 6009/94, Shafran & Ors v. the Chief Military Prosecutor, 48(5) P.D. 573; HCJ 442/87, Shaul v. the Military Advocate General, 42(2) P.D. 749; HCJ 4550/94, Isha v. the Attorney-General, 49(5) P.D. 849. 15