A/HRC/15/50 47. A second category of cases raises questions about the extent of the inquiries undertaken. For example, the Committee would have benefited from clarification from Israeli investigators with respect to the shooting of Majda and Rayya Hajaj at Juhr ad-Dik on 4 January 2009.52 The Israeli report of the investigation into this incident notes the indictment of a soldier on the charge of manslaughter for shooting a civilian at the time and place where the Hajaj women – one of whom was carrying a white flag – were killed.53 Yet, the press release announcing the soldier’s indictment appeared to concern an incident where a man, rather than two women, was shot, suggesting that the indictment may relate to an entirely different incident.54 The admitted confusion as to the identity and number of the victims at Juhr ad-Dik that day calls into serious question whether a full and prompt investigation was undertaken into the shooting of the Hajaj women. 48. Another case concerned the Abd al-Dayem condolence tents incident.55 The FactFinding Mission alleged that Israeli soldiers had launched a deliberate attack on civilians, killing 5 and injuring 20. The results of the command and criminal investigations suggest instead that soldiers were firing on combatants launching a Grad rocket and that soldiers “did not identify any civilians in the vicinity” of “the terrorist squad”.56 The Committee notes the discrepancy in the two versions of the incident. Owing to the lack of cooperation from Israel, it is unable to confirm that extensive efforts were taken by investigators to reconcile these conflicting accounts. 49. In the al-Quds hospital case,57 there is insufficient information to determine with any accuracy what the results of the inquiry demonstrate. Israel has communicated very little with respect to this incident. The first Israeli report indicated that an inquiry was ongoing into attacks on medical facilities.58 The second report noted that the third special command investigation examined incidents of shootings at medical facilities, buildings, vehicles and crews.59 The third report reflected that disciplinary action was taken against some officers as a result of these attacks,60 but it is unclear whether that disciplinary action corresponded to the attack on al-Quds hospital or to attacks on other medical centres. The Committee has no basis for assessing whether this investigation was, in fact, effective and thorough. 50. Third, owing to a lack of cooperation from Israel, the Committee is not in a position to evaluate a range of allegations in the FFM report about the way in which the Israeli system of military investigations actually functions. For example, it is alleged that: the system of command investigations was not effective owing to the failure of investigators to comply with regulations and orders;61 command investigations obstructed criminal investigations by destroying the scene of the crime and obstructing and delaying the process of identifying and collecting evidence;62 penalties imposed on Israeli offenders had been noticeably more lenient than those imposed on Palestinians;63 command investigations had 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 14 Ibid., paras. 764–769. “Second update”, paras. 99–102. See IDF Military Advocate General takes disciplinary action, indicts soldiers following investigations into incidents during Operation Cast Lead, 6 July 2010. Available from http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/Press+Releases/10/07/0601.htm. A/HRC/12/48, paras. 867–885. “Second update”, paras. 113–117. A/HRC/12/48, paras. 596–629 (al-Quds hospital) and paras. 630–652 (al-Wafa hospital). “The operation in Gaza”, para. 376. “January update”, paras. 111–112. “Second update”, para. 60. A/HRC/12/48, para. 1816. Ibid., para. 1817. Ibid., paras. 1818 and 1825.