A/HRC/8/5 page 12 with non-OECD countries constrain the host State’s regulatory powers significantly more than those signed with OECD countries - and that country risk ratings alone do not seem to account for the variance.30 Yet it is precisely in developing countries that regulatory development may be most needed. 37. When investment cases go to international arbitration they are generally treated as commercial disputes in which public interest considerations, including human rights, play little if any role. Additionally, arbitration processes are often conducted in strict confidentiality so that the public in the country facing a claim may not even know of its existence. Where human rights and other public interests are concerned, transparency should be a governing principle, without prejudice to legitimate commercial confidentiality. 38. States, companies, the institutions supporting investments, and those designing arbitration procedures should work towards developing better means to balance investor interests and the needs of host States to discharge their human rights obligations.31 39. Now consider an example from the home State side. It concerns export credit agencies (ECAs), which finance or guarantee exports and investments in regions and sectors that may be too risky for the private sector alone. ECAs may be State agencies or privatized, but all are mandated by the State and perform a public function. Despite this State nexus, however, relatively few ECAs explicitly consider human rights at any stage of their involvement; indeed, in informal discussions, a number indicate they might require specific authority from their government overseers to do so. 40. On policy grounds alone, a strong case can be made that ECAs, representing not only commercial interests but also the broader public interest, should require clients to perform adequate due diligence on their potential human rights impacts. This would enable ECAs to flag up where serious human rights concerns would require greater oversight - and possibly indicate where State support should not proceed or continue. 41. Closer alignment between a State’s ECA and its official development agency is also desirable. A development agency may view the arrival of an ECA-supported private investment in a particular region of a country as reason to focus its own efforts elsewhere. But if the 30 See “Stabilization clauses and human rights”, available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Stabilization-Clauses-and-Human-Rights-11-Mar-2008.pdf. 31 Similar concerns have been raised regarding international and regional trade agreements, specifically about the State’s ability to ensure access to essential services and protect the right to health. The Special Representative has not had the opportunity to conduct independent research on these trade-related issues.