A/HRC/13/36 imposes on States parties a positive obligation towards persons who are particularly vulnerable because of their status as persons deprived of liberty, and complements for them the ban on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contained in article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee also recalls that the principle set forth in article 10, paragraph 1, constitutes the basis for the more specific obligations of States parties in respect of criminal justice, which are set forth in article 10, paragraphs 2 and 3. 33. In the endeavour to protect intelligence sources, some States have amended the regulations governing legal or administrative procedures to allow the non-disclosure of materials to suspects.19 Secrecy and immunity doctrines should not be applied where serious human rights violations are being investigated, such as the absolute prohibition of torture and cases of killings or disappearances. Independent, impartial, transparent and credible investigations are required by law to ensure accountability. Individual responsibility cannot be avoided through amnesties or immunities, and other limitations to the recognition of legal responsibility. 34. States must refrain from granting or acquiescing in impunity at the national level through amnesties.20 Amnesties for gross and serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law may also violate customary international law,21 and the continued passing, application and non-revocation of amnesty laws22 contributes to a culture of impunity. 35. Since September 2001, there has been a trend towards outsourcing the collection of intelligence to private contractors. While the involvement of private actors can be necessary as a technical matter in order to have access to information (for instance for electronic surveillance), there are reasons to be wary of using contractors to interrogate persons who are deprived of their liberty. The responsibility to protect the right to life, physical integrity or liberty of individuals should remain within the exclusive domain of the State. The combination of a lack of proper training, the introduction of a profit motive into situations which are prone to human rights violations, and the often questionable prospect that such contractors will be subject to judicial and parliamentary accountability mechanisms are all 19 20 21 22 GE.10-10442 International Commission of Jurists, Accessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights (2009), p. 78. See footnote 16 supra in relation to Human Rights Committee general comment No. 31, para. 18. See also principle 36 (a) of the set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity; Human Rights Committee communication No. 45/1979, Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, 30 March 1982, para. 15; see also Human Rights Committee concluding observations on Venezuela, 26 April 2001 (CCPR/CO/71/VEN), para. 8. International tribunals have had few opportunities to address the question of whether States’ obligations under customary international law may be violated by an amnesty. A 1998 decision by a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia suggested, however, that an amnesty for torture (and, by implication, for other conduct whose prohibition in international law has the status of a peremptory norm) would be “international unlawful” (see Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement of 10 December 1998, para. 155). See also Prosecutor v. Morris Kalon and Prosecutor v. Brima Bazzy Kamara, para. 82. See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Barrio Altos v. Peru, where it found that “Amnesty Laws No. 26479 and No. 26492 are incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and, consequently, lack legal effect”, 14 March 2001, para. 51/4. See general comment No. 31 at para. 18. See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Servellón Garcia et al. v. Honduras, where the Court noted that there is an obligation on States not to resort to legal concepts such as amnesties or other measures to eliminate responsibility, 21 September 2006. See also Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, in which the Court noted that the State must “remove all de facto and legal mechanisms and obstacles that maintain impunity”, para. 277. 13