A/HRC/22/59 conducted in the region and from Geneva, including via Skype and telephone, with victims and witnesses inside the country. The total number of interviews conducted since the mandate began in September 2011 stands at 1,391. 9. Photographs, video recordings, satellite imagery and forensic and medical records were collected and analysed. Reports from Governments and non-Governmental sources, academic analyses, as well as United Nations reports, including from human rights bodies and mechanisms and humanitarian organizations, formed part of the investigation. 10. The standard of proof used in previous reports remained. Such a standard was met when incidents were corroborated to a level where the commission had reasonable grounds to believe that incidents had occurred as described. 11. The commission is grateful to all those who cooperated in the fulfilment of its mandate. II. Context A. Political context 12. In the last six months of the period under review, the conflict became increasingly violent and complex, and efforts to achieve a political settlement stalled. In supporting various parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, regional and international actors hampered the prospects of a negotiated settlement owing to their divergent interests. The position of key international actors remains unchanged. 13. After a unanimous vote by the Security Council supporting a ceasefire in the Syrian Arab Republic on 24 October 2012, both the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and anti-Government armed groups, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) accepted to abide by the terms of a truce over the Eid al-Adha religious holiday from 26 to 30 October. The truce, however, did not hold, as hostilities continued between the parties. 14. The creation of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces on 12 November was a significant development within the Syrian opposition. The coalition is made up of representatives of external Syrian opposition groups and “internal revolutionary forces”, including the FSA. Moaz al-Khateeb was elected to lead the coalition. The head of the Syrian National Council, George Sabra, was elected as one of the coalition’s vice-presidents. Reactions to the coalition have been mixed. The League of Arab States recognized the coalition as the “representative and main interlocutor with the Arab League”. More than 13 anti-Government armed groups, including the al-Nusra Front, announced their rejection of the legitimacy of the coalition. 15. On 11 December, the State Department of the United States of America declared the al-Nusra Front to be a “foreign terrorist organization” and an affiliate of Al-Qaida in Iraq. 16. On 6 January 2013, President Al Assad delivered a speech ruling out any negotiations with “terrorists”, stating that a political settlement was only possible with a nationalist opposition that was not seeking “to divide Syria”. He also outlined his vision of a political settlement whereby outside countries would stop arming “terrorist groups” inside the country, after which the Syrian army would halt its military operations but reserve the right to respond to any attacks by armed groups. He proposed the holding of a national conference with the aim of establishing a national charter leading to parliamentary elections and the formation of a new Government. 17. The Secretary-General expressed his disappointment at the speech, as it had not addressed the final communiqué of the Action Group for Syria (Geneva communiqué) of 30 6 GE.13-10627