A/HRC/29/43 judicial system and ensuring the dissemination of information on the work of the courts, and encourages the courts to adopt the provisions of the Order.10 37. In particular, the process for appointing judges should be as transparent as possible. The executive authorities continue to play a significant role in the appointment of judges. The majority of judges are also often appointed for a short tenure, a fact that increases their dependence on the executive authorities that appoint them. 38. The Special Rapporteur calls upon the authorities of Belarus to make public the guidelines they use for the selection and appointment of judges. While decrees relating to the appointment of judges are public, the criteria used to reach these decisions remain unknown to both the general public and candidates for judicial office. 11 39. Since January 2007, the Code of Judicial Systems and Status of Judges has required judges to be appointed for a term of five years; judges may also be appointed for a further term, or indefinitely.12 The Special Rapporteur notes with concern that this has led to fewer judges being appointed to tenured positions, and the negative impact this could have on judicial independence. 40. With regard to the dismissal of judges, the President retains extensive powers to dismiss a sitting judge without taking into considerations any further opinions, and “to apply a disciplinary penalty on judges without any public or legally defined procedure of examination”.13 B. Independence of lawyers 41. United Nations human rights mechanisms, including the universal periodic review, have repeatedly called upon Belarus to respond to the concerns of defence lawyers and to address the pattern of intimidation against lawyers and of interference in their work (see A/HRC/15/16, paras. 50 and 98.26). The continued failure to address this issue has had a chilling effect on the independence of lawyers. 14 Like other special procedures mandate holders, the Special Rapporteur is concerned by the frequent targeting of lawyers working on human rights cases (A/68/276, para. 97). He reiterates his call upon Belarus to restore the licences of lawyers revoked after they represented candidates in the 2010 presidential elections.15 42. Domestic legislation, including Presidential Decree No. 12, undermines the independence of the legal profession by subordinating lawyers to the control of the Ministry of Justice and introducing obligatory membership in a State-controlled bar association. The Special Rapporteur calls upon Belarus to take all appropriate measures, including a review of the Constitution and laws, to meet the international minimum standards as set out in the 10 11 12 13 14 15 8 Coalition report (see footnote 4), p. 8. Belarusian Helsinki Committee, Independence of the Judiciary in the Republic of Belarus, 2014, p. 5. Ibid., p. 7. Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, Judicial Independence in the Eastern Partnership Countries, 2011, p. 20. CAT/C/BLR/CO/4, para. 12 (a); A/HRC/17/30/Add.1, para. 101; A/HRC/23/52, para. 64; A/68/276, para. 76; A/HRC/25/55/Add.3, para. 61. See also CAT/C/BLR/CO/4, para. 12(c); E/CN.4/2001/65/Add.1, para. 123 (c); and A/HRC/23/52, paras. 65 and 119 (f).