A/HRC/30/44 25. In Philip Morris (Switzerland) v. Uruguay (2010), the multinational sued under the Switzerland–Uruguay bilateral investment treaty claiming that the Uruguayan anti-smoking legislation devalued its investments, blithely disregarding the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.43 WHO submitted an amicus curiae brief. 26. In 2009, an Ecuadorian court fined Chevron for environmental damage caused by its activities. Chevron refused to pay and turned to UNCITRAL to demand damages from Ecuador for lost profits.44 Litigation is pending. 27. When Philip Morris filed a claim against Australia 45 in 2011 challenging the Australian measures to reduce tobacco consumption, the Government stated that it rejected investor–State dispute settlement “provisions that would confer greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses. … The Government has not and will not accept provisions that limit its capacity to put health warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco products or its ability to continue the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. … If Australian businesses are concerned about sovereign risk in Australian trading partner countries, they will need to make their own assessments about whether they want to commit to investing in those countries.”46 28. Only gradually are governments and parliamentarians beginning to counter the corporate move against the fundamentals of State sovereignty. In the European Parliament, the issue of corporate blackmail has been raised in connection with the debate on the TTIP, arguing on the basis of Vattenfall and Veolia that multinational companies are using investor protection rules to achieve corporate aims, increasing the cost to the taxpayer of defending public policy and rules. A concept paper of the European Commission, “Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform”,47 outlines possible improvements in free trade agreement models so as to guarantee the State’s policy space. Experience has shown that self-regulation has proven insufficient,48 notwithstanding the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which should be made legally binding by treaty. In this context, it must be stressed that the possibility that arbitrations may find for the State and against the investor does not remove the danger nor legitimize the investor–State dispute settlement model, since the mere threat of such arbitration has dissuaded even developed States like Canada from adopting social legislation. Developing countries are even more vulnerable to the threat,49 since they lack the resources to defend themselves against major transnational enterprises. 29. The manifest abuse of rights by investors is so brazen that one could imagine that one day the military-industrial complex might invoke investor–State dispute settlement when a country decides to reduce or terminate the production of anti-personnel landmines 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 12 www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-will-investor-state-arbitration-sendrestrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/. www.italaw.com/cases/257. See also truth-out.org/news/item/23788, fpif.org/nafta-20-modelcorporate-rule/, and content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2053075,00.html. www.italaw.com/cases/851 and /www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-will-investorstate-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/. www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-TradePolicy-Statement.aspx. The current Government of Australia may consider investor–State dispute settlement on a treaty-by-treaty basis. trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF. See also the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, which presents an action menu for investment regime reform. UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note, May 2015. ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2012/11/FDI-Perspectives-eBook-v2-Nov-2012.pdf. Guatemala, www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-suestates-ttip-icsid.