A/HRC/38/38 selection and appointment of judges worldwide, and raised general concerns over the involvement of the legislative or executive branches of power in judicial appointments.43 51. The election of judges by parliament is sometimes seen as providing greater democratic legitimacy, but it may lead to the politicization of judicial appointments, with political considerations prevailing over objective criteria set out in international and regional standards (merit, qualifications, integrity, sense of independence and impartiality, etc.). 52. In cases in which constitutional or legislative provisions prescribe that the Head of State, the Government or the legislative branch of power formally appoints or promotes judges, regional standards provide that the judicial council or an equivalent independent authority, such as a qualification commission, should be authorized to make recommendations or express opinions that the relevant appointing authorities follow in practice.44 53. The responses to the questionnaire show that States have elaborated different procedures for the appointment and promotion of judges, which can be divided into two main categories: elective systems, in which judges are elected by parliament,45 and direct appointment systems. In direct appointment systems, the appointing body can be the President of the Republic/Head of State,46 the Government47 or the judicial council itself.48 In most parliamentary systems, the Head of State is bound by a proposal from the judicial council, parliament or a combination of both. In some countries, the President of the Republic retains the discretionary power not to follow the advice of the judicial council.49 54. In many countries, judges are selected on the basis of national competitive examinations, 50 whereas in others, judges are selected from experienced practitioners. 51 Information concerning judicial vacancies should be made publicly available. The Special Rapporteur has underscored that competitive examinations conducted, at least partly, in a written and anonymous manner can serve as an important tool in the selection process (see A/HRC/11/41, para. 30). B. Court administration and budget control 55. There are no clearly established standards with regard to the competences of judicial councils in relation to court administration and budget control. Some regional standards recommend that judicial councils be entrusted with general responsibilities with regard to the administration of the court system and/or the allocation of budgetary resources to the various courts,52 while others only provide that such councils should be consulted by the other State powers on these issues.53 56. The Special Rapporteur considers that entrusting judicial councils with general competences in relation to court administration and budget control constitutes an essential 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 Similar concerns have been raised by the Venice Commission in its opinion No. 403/2006 on judicial appointments, paras. 7–17. See opinion No. 10 of the Consultative Council of European Judges, para. 49; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 47; and the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence, para. 23. Costa Rica, El Salvador and Slovenia. E.g. Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Liberia, Norway and Slovakia. Australia, Denmark and Sweden. E.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mongolia and Morocco. Lithuania. Algeria, Belgium, Portugal, Serbia and Sweden. Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region, principles 36–37; opinion No. 10 of the Consultative Council of European Judges, paras. 76–79; and the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence, para. 6. European Charter on the Statute of Judges, art. 1.8; and the revised Universal Charter of the Judge, art. 2-3. 11