A/HRC/5/20 page 4 (a) The events of early November 2006 in Gaza, and in Beit Hanoun in particular, required an investigation into possible serious human rights violations by Israel. The Council’s decision to dispatch the High-Level Mission to Beit Hanoun reflected its deep concern at the corroborated reports of the killing and injuring of civilians by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The information presented to the Mission during its briefings in Geneva in early December confirmed the gravity and urgency of the situation; (b) The mandate of the High-Level Mission not only explicitly required that it “travel to Beit Hanoun” but that it “assess the situation of victims” and “address the needs of survivors”. Each of these elements required that the High-Level Mission have access to victims, survivors and witnesses in Beit Hanoun and elsewhere; (c) The High-Level Mission carefully investigated the possibility of assessing the situation of victims and survivors by visiting places outside Israel and Gaza where those individuals may have been removed for medical treatment. Inquiries revealed that of 51 individuals injured in the incident at Beit Hanoun, all except 6 were treated in the occupied territory of Gaza. Of those six who were removed for treatment, three were hospitalized in Israel and three in Egypt. Clearly some of the victims of the attack were not among the dead or injured, for example, family members of those killed. For these individuals, the possibility of them leaving Gaza was extremely limited. It is fair to say that the continued military occupation of Gaza itself was the greatest factor frustrating the mission, preventing as it did victims of the Beit Hanoun incident from leaving the territory, and preventing the mission from entering Gaza. Thus, to meet with and assess the situation of victims and to address the needs of survivors, the mission had no choice but to travel to the occupied Palestinian territory of Gaza; (d) Access to Gaza and to Beit Hanoun might have been possible via Egypt and the Rafah Crossing, thus obviating the need for official visas to enter Israel. The High-Level Mission investigated this possibility closely, and raised the issue with the Permanent Representatives of Egypt and Israel in Geneva, with United Nations actors in Gaza and with United Nations security officials. Ultimately the mission reluctantly accepted that entry via the Rafah Crossing was not feasible for a number of reasons: (i) First, the Rafah Crossing was largely restricted to Palestinian trade and not open to pedestrians. Further, from 1 June 2006 until 11 December 2006, the crossing had opened only 23 times, and in the month of November 2006 had opened only on two days; (ii) Second, crossing at Rafah required the cooperation of Israeli authorities, which may not have been forthcoming in light of the statements to the mission by the Permanent Representative of Israel mentioned above; (iii) Third, at the time, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security did not authorize United Nations missions to make the crossing at Rafah for security reasons; (iv) Finally, entering Gaza via Egypt would frustrate the High-Level Mission’s expressed desire to meet with Israeli officials and organizations.