A/HRC/38/33 I. Introduction 1. The present report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, has been prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 35/19, focusing on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its impact on social protection.1 2. The majority of low-income developing countries are already included in IMF programmes or are likely to be so in the near future,2 yet fewer than one in five of the poorest 20 per cent of people in those countries is covered by any form of social protection. And any assistance they receive will only cover a mere 13 per cent of their consumption needs. Even in lower-middle-income countries, fewer than half of those living in poverty receive such assistance. Since the vast majority of the hundreds of millions of people thus living in penury and without any form of social protection are unable to enjoy most of their human rights,3 the question arises as to what their own Governments are doing in response, and what role the international community plays. 3. No international institution exerts greater influence than IMF over issues such as distribution, including social protection. But for many years, it took the position that these issues were not its concern; it could take account only of macroeconomic issues narrowly defined. Other institutions were left to pick up the pieces in the social area, but could only do so within the confines of the fiscal space, if any, left open after IMF prescriptions had been adopted. 4. IMF has long been criticized for its disregard of “social issues” and its impact thereon. In 1987, when a ground-breaking and devastatingly critical report entitled Adjustment with a Human Face 4 was published by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), IMF subscribed to the original Washington Consensus, which prioritized “prudent macroeconomic policies, outward orientation and free-market capitalism”.5 The “imposition” of structural adjustment policies on many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America were said by human rights groups and others to have further immiserated the living conditions of the poor.6 5. Such criticism, combined with political pushback, led to an “augmented Washington consensus” with a new emphasis on social safety nets and “pro-poor growth”.7 The advice subsequently proffered by IMF during the 1997 Asian financial crisis was widely faulted by Governments and commentators and, as the Asian recession abated and the developing country debt crisis was resolved, IMF receded into the background and underwent significant staff cutbacks. But the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 returned it to the centre of international economic governance. At its 2009 summit, the Group of 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 The Special Rapporteur is grateful to Christiaan van Veen for his superb research and analysis for the present report. According to IMF, 40 per cent of the 59 low-income developing countries now face significant debtrelated challenges, and 60 per cent are at low or moderate risk. See IMF, “Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in Low-Income Developing Countries — 2018” (15 February 2018), para. 72. The Special Rapporteur has elaborated on these linkages in previous reports. G. Cornia, R. Jolly and F. Stewart (eds.), Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth (1987). J. Williamson (ed.), “What Washington Means by Policy Reform”, in Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (April 1990). “[T]he fact that even in times of severe resources constraints whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors, the vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be protected”, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights general comment No. 3 on the nature of States parties’ obligations, para. 12. J. Williamson, “An Agenda for Restarting Growth and Reform”, in After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, P. Kuczynski and J. Williamson, eds. (March 2003). See also A. Abrams, “The IMF’s Role in Social Protection: Fund Policy and Guidance”, Background Document No. BD/17-01/01 (5 July 2017). 3