A/HRC/38/33 16 years ago, thus assumes surprising importance. The thrust of the paper can be summarized as follows: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is not applicable to IMF; its provisions have not attained customary international law status that would make them applicable independently of the Covenant; IMF promotes economic and social rights indirectly by contributing to conducive economic conditions; and IMF cannot promote human rights directly without contravening the Articles of Agreement.31 The Deputy General Counsel of IMF informed the Special Rapporteur that this position remained unchanged. He reiterated that it was not bound by human rights norms, “except perhaps in cases of genocide”. 19. Mr. Gianviti’s paper does not address the question of civil and political rights, but IMF seems to assume without further explanation that the same analysis would apply to the two sets of rights. Essentially, the paper is an anachronism and serves IMF badly as a statement of current policy. It is rooted in the history of the 1950s and 1960s and focused heavily on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which was important in 2002. And it long predates the fundamental changes that are said to have occurred since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. 20. Mr. Gianviti’s appeal to the analogy of European law to strengthen the position of IMF underscores its anachronistic nature. The paper notes that “the European Community, not being a party to the European Convention on Human Rights [the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms], is not bound by its provisions”. But today, the European Union considers itself bound by the provisions of the Convention, which have the status of general principles of law. 21. Mr. Gianviti’s focus on whether IMF is formally bound under international law by the Covenant’s provisions has been much criticized.32 In fact, his paper has very little to say about the crucial issue of how IMF should, in practice, take account of human rights considerations in their many diverse manifestations. The consistent practice of IMF has been to sidestep them and assume they are simply not relevant to macroeconomic policy.33 However, this is not the occasion for a wide-ranging review of such matters, which IMF itself should undertake. B. Grey zones: corruption and military spending 22. IMF first addressed corruption in depth in a 1997 guidance note on “governance issues”.34 Increased attention to the issue at IMF and the World Bank at that time reflected a realization on the part of the proponents of the Washington Consensus that corruption had undermined the institutions that had been key to successful policy reform and economic development.35 The note followed the World Bank’s definition of corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain”. The IMF approach mainly involved advocacy of “policies and the development of institutions and administrative systems that aim to eliminate the opportunity for rent seeking, corruption and fraudulent activity”.36 It would only respond to specific instances of corruption when there was “reason to believe they could have significant macroeconomic implications”, such as when “the amounts involved are 31 32 33 34 35 36 For a recent reiteration of position of IMF on human rights, see www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ IEDebt/impactassessments/IMF.pdf. For important critiques see: Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/2016/1); M. Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law (Hart Publishing, 2003); B. Ghazi, The IMF, the World Bank Group and the Question of Human Rights (Transnational Publishers, 2005); and A. McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights (Routledge, 2009). A speechwriter for Ms. Lagarde is reported as saying “[y]ou cannot put human rights in a speech, it’ll be taken out”. T. Reinold, “The Path of Least Resistance: Mainstreaming ‘Social Issues’ in the International Monetary Fund”, in Global Society, vol. 31, iss. 3, 2017, p. 401. IMF, “Guidance Note on the Role of the IMF in Governance Issues” (August 1997). D. Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?”, in Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 44, No. 4 (December 2006), pp. 973–987. “Guidance Note”, p. 2. 7