A/HRC/32/38 search engines and domain name registrars, nevertheless face the threat that States will disrupt local infrastructure, threaten the safety of local employees, or block local access to their platforms. 41. Private actors may also request intermediaries to restrict or remove content. For instance, intellectual property complaints often arise when a private party alleges that a person has shared or used content in a manner that violates its copyright or has created a domain name that violates its trademark. While fair use and other defences to such complaints may be available, intellectual property frameworks may inhibit cultural and artistic expression (see A/HRC/28/57). 42. The European Court of Justice, in Google Spain v. Mario Costeja González, compelled Google under the Data Protection Directive of the European Union to delist search results based on web pages that identified González, even though the original publication of those pages was itself not subject to takedown.24 The decision has found an active life outside the European context. 25 The scope and implementation of this approach raise questions about the appropriate balance between the rights to privacy and protection of personal data on one hand, and the right to seek, receive and impart information containing such data on the other. 43. Intermediaries are increasingly required to assess the validity of State requests and private complaints against general legal criteria, and remove or delink such content based on such assessments. For example, the Cybercrime Act, 2015 of the United Republic of Tanzania only exempts hyperlink providers from liability for information linked provided that they “immediately remove[ ] or disable[ ] access to the information after receiving an order to do so from the relevant authority”.26 In the context of copyright, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of the United States of America exempts providers of “online services and network access” from liability for third party content only if they respond “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity” upon notice of such infringement. 27 These notice and takedown frameworks have been criticized for incentivizing questionable claims and for failing to provide adequate protection for the intermediaries that seek to apply fair and human rights-sensitive standards to content regulation. 44. Another major concern is that private intermediaries are typically ill equipped to make determinations of content illegality. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has observed that private actors “lack the ability to weigh rights and to interpret the law in accordance with freedom of speech and other human rights standards”.28 This may be due to resource constraints, lack of oversight and accountability, or potential conflicts of interest. In the face of potential liability, companies may be prone to self- or overcensorship. Extralegal restrictions 45. States also seek to restrict digital content outside the law. Some States have pushed for social media companies and other hosts of user-generated content to monitor and take down content on their own initiative, rather than wait for law-based requests from the Government. Government officials have also attempted to persuade companies to adopt “counter-speech” initiatives through public forums, campaigns and in private discussions. 24 25 26 27 28 12 Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), case C-131/12 (13 May 2014). Submission of Article 19. Para. 43 (a). United States Code, title 17, sect. 512 (c) (1) (C). Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Freedom of Expression and the Internet, pp. 47-48.