A/HRC/25/60 known, that there was a real risk that it could lead to or was acquired through impermissible means in another State. Due diligence in making such a determination should be demanded from States that rely on information not gathered by their own agents. By accepting information without investigating or questioning the manner in which it was extracted, the receiving State inevitably implies the “recognition of lawfulness” of such practices, even if that information was obtained only for operational purposes, and aids and assists the torturing State in maintaining impunity for the acts of torture.44 Even by once receiving information tainted by torture, the receiving State does in fact encourage the receipt of information from agencies that pursue investigations in violation of the framework of international human rights law. It creates a demand for information tainted by torture and elevates its operational use to a policy. In order to avoid complicity, executive agencies must assess the situation and rule out the existence of such a risk before interacting with foreign States. After-the-fact acceptance and use of information that is likely to have been obtained by torture or other ill-treatment constitute implicit recognition of the situation created by the torture or ill-treatment as lawful, since it treats the information no differently than legally obtained information.45 Assurances 57. The invocation of “assurances” as a means of eliminating the possible risk of torture or other ill-treatment is of great concern. In the context of the non-refoulement provision, the Special Rapporteur, the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee have found that assurances from other States do not relieve the sending State from its responsibility to prevent torture. Similarly, assurances by providers of information that torture or other ill-treatment was not involved in producing it are not sufficient to permit cooperation where a real risk is identified.46 Promises of humane treatment given by Governments that practice torture or ill-treatment are not reliable and do not provide an effective safeguard against the real risk of acts of torture or other ill-treatment. States that engage in torture or ill-treatment routinely deny and conceal its use and it is therefore difficult, if not impossible, for executive agencies to verify whether their assurances are truthful. In addition, assurances are not legally binding or enforceable and the States concerned are unlikely to follow up on the assurances provided, since verifying and acknowledging that the abuse has occurred means an admission by both countries that they are responsible for violations of the prohibition of torture. 58. While such findings have been made in the particular context of international transfers of detainees, the reasoning applies with equal force to the collection, sharing and receiving of information by executive agencies and to the obligation of States to prevent and discourage torture and other ill-treatment. 4. National guidelines 59. In an attempt to regulate the sharing and receiving of information by executive agencies and in order to avoid allegations of complicity in acts of torture or other illtreatment, States have adopted internal guidelines addressed to executive agencies. 60. The Special Rapporteur welcomes recent initiatives by some States to establish and publish guidelines for their intelligence services and commitments they have made not to participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or other ill-treatment for any 44 45 46 See A/HRC/10/3, para. 55, and “Rotten fruit: State solicitation, acceptance and the use of information obtained through torture by another State”, p. 376. Ibid., p.377. A/59/324, para. 31, A/60/316, para. 51, and report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Comm DH(2004)13, para.19. 15