A/HRC/18/21 19. By the time the Mission visited Yemen, the humanitarian situation was already deteriorating. The sabotage of a power line, an oil pipeline and the fuel supply was causing severe hardship, compounded by water and cooking gas shortages. Many Yemenis had lost their jobs and income, while prices for essential goods were soaring. 20. Yemeni authorities appeared to have lost effective control of parts of the country and in the major cities, including the capital. Armed opponents appeared to be in de facto control of entire districts.5 21. There was widespread fear that despite efforts by the Vice-President and others to restore calm and build bridges with all sides, a civil war was looming. B. Military and security forces involved in attacks 22. The Government of Yemen resorted to using all armed units at its disposal, from the army to intelligence and law enforcement agencies, in response to demonstrations or in dealing with armed efforts to bring about a change in regime. The Yemeni air force has been involved in clashes with armed groups around Sana’a and Abyan, while the Yemeni navy reportedly supported ground troops fighting in Abyan by shelling from the sea. The elite Republican Guard is present throughout Yemen, but concentrated near the main towns. It has reportedly been engaged in crowd control, along with other army units. Military police provide security for certain public buildings and have thus been involved in confrontations with protesters in some instances. 23. The two official intelligence agencies, the Political Security (al-amn al-siyassi) and the National Security (al-amn al-qawmi) report directly to the President and operate with minimal parliamentary or judicial oversight. The Political Security is mandated to identify and combat political crimes and acts of sabotage and has detention facilities throughout Yemen. The National Security was established by Presidential decree in 2002 to focus on counter-terrorism. Over the years, many journalists, activists and human rights defenders have reportedly been detained and tortured at detention facilities of the National Security. 24. The Ministry of Interior operates several security units. Its public security forces have been involved in crowd control, using water cannons, batons, plastic shields and tear gas launchers.6 The Criminal Investigation Department is involved in investigations and manages pretrial detention facilities throughout Yemen. The Central Security Force is a paramilitary unit that was established before unity, in 1980, and which has its own counterterrorism strike force and crowd-control units. It is present in towns and the countryside, where it often constitutes the only law enforcement agency. 25. An official, tribe-based reserve force under the Ministry of Interior also exists; its officers, usually tribal leaders, collect salaries. This reserve force is said to have been mobilized to fight the Huthis in the past, and to have participated in recent demonstrations in support of President Saleh. 5 6 For example, Mission delegates meeting with key opponents in Sana’a and Ta’izz were given military escort to within a few blocks of the meeting places, then handed over to armed elements to escort them to the meeting place. The delegates were also repeatedly warned that the State could not offer them protection if they visited those areas, but they were not prevented from going there. Mission delegates were informed about and saw evidence of the use of outdated teargas canisters which may have caused rashes, serious burns and suffocation. Delegates were also told that deployed water cannons were often connected to sewage water systems. 7