A/HRC/38/31 conclude that national politics had nothing to do with the authorities’ reaction in handling the Kasaï crisis, there is little proof of a direct link between the wave of violence in Kasaï and the electoral process. 18. In the run-up to independence, violence had broken out within the Luba population. The Luba people share a common language, Tshiluba, and at this juncture they are relatively united. On the other hand, with the division of the former Province of Kasaï Occidental into two new provinces in 2015, tensions grew between Luba groups and Chokwe and Pende people, who live in the southern and eastern parts of Kasaï Province. While Kasaï Central remains dominated by the Luba population, the Luba have lost influence in Kasaï Province to the Chokwe and the Pende. It is also impossible to consider the crisis in the Kasaïs in isolation from pre-existing local conflicts involving customary chiefs and the sharing of land and mining resources. 19. Customary authority, which is closely linked to ethnic identity, is an important part of the local power system. Customary chiefs, in addition to performing important spiritual functions, play a major role in public administration, village management and access to land and local justice. They are named according to traditional customs and are subsequently recognized by the public authorities, who pay them a salary. While the role of customary chief is supposed to be apolitical, the State authorities regularly bring pressure to bear on the chiefs to encourage them to fall into line politically with the provincial and national authorities, going so far as to refuse to recognize those who nonetheless have been named through the traditional practice. 20. Belief in witchcraft and supernatural powers remains widespread in society, including in the defence and security forces. Jujus are given a great deal of importance. A large number of customary rules govern the life of the community, and breaking them can lead to serious consequences. VI. Parties involved in the crisis A. Defence and security forces 21. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has still not been able to establish a wellorganized, professional army. The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) continue to commit frequent and serious human rights violations against civilians and to live off the civilian population. 22. When the crisis began in Kasaï, soldiers of the 2101st regiment were stationed in Kananga. They reported to the 21st military region, based in Mbuji-Mayi, Kasaï Oriental. The regiment, which had been under the fifth integrated brigade, was composed of a mix of reintegrated former militia members and troops of the national army. The presence in the regiment of Kinyarwanda-speaking military personnel from the eastern part of the country was hotly criticized by Chief Kamuina Nsapu, who accused them of being foreigners. Some military commanders had reportedly been involved in serious human rights violations in other parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 23. FARDC initially reacted with brutality against the Kamuina Nsapu militia. Despite the arrival of reinforcements at the end of 2016, which brought the number of military personnel in Kasaï to 7,000, FARDC failed to stop the rapid expansion of the militia. On 9 March 2017, the Government established the Greater Kasaï Operations Sector, with its command centre in Kananga, in order to confront the Kamuina Nsapu militia, which the Government qualified as terrorists. In the territory of Kamonia, in Kasa�� Province, FARDC conducted operations with the support of the Bana Mura militia. Towards the end of 2017, the authorities started to reduce the number of troops in Kasaï. 24. The Congolese National Police clearly lacked equipment and training to respond to the violence in Kasaï, despite the arrival of a unit of reinforcements specialized in maintaining order. 6 GE.18-10936