A/HRC/14/21 63. A further claim in the EMTA submission is that the British legislative proposal would appear to put the United Kingdom in contravention of international treaties that guarantee actionable property rights, such as the European Convention on Human Rights.74 This submission appears to be based on the misguided notion that the right to property is an absolute right. Human rights supervisory bodies have made clear that a State is entitled to limit or control the use of property (including contractual rights with an economic value) in accordance with the general interest by enforcing such laws as it deems necessary for the aim pursued.75 The limitation imposed by the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act is a “control of use” rather than a deprivation since there is no practical or legal extinction of the rights of ownership. Significantly, the Act does not preclude creditors from seeking reasonable recompense but merely seeks to prevent them from profiteering at the expense of indebted poor countries as well as the taxpayers who have contributed to international debt relief efforts. There are also compelling public interest grounds for reducing the recoverability of debts and judgements by vulture funds, namely, that the Act promotes fairness among creditors and that it promotes the development of HIPCs. 64. It is noteworthy that EMTA includes among its members a number of vulture funds (such as Elliott Associates, Debt Advisory International and Greylock Capital), as well as law firms such as Allen & Overy (which represented Donegal International in its lawsuit against Zambia) and Dechert LLP (which represented the two vulture funds, Hamsah Investments and Wall Capital, in their lawsuit against Liberia). It may therefore be asserted that the EMTA opposition to legislative measures to curtail vulture fund activity is actuated more by self-interest than a real concern for the development prospects of poor countries. 65. Governments have a responsibility to intervene “when markets fail to create the conditions in which all people, including the poorest and most marginalized, can exercise the full range of their human rights”.76 Although the consultation paper does not explicitly state so, it can be argued that the British legislation is ultimately intended to help HIPCs create the necessary conditions for the realization of the basic rights of their citizens and the right to development. This would be in keeping with the spirit of international assistance and cooperation recognized in the Charter of the United Nations and binding international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which the United Kingdom has ratified.77 66. It is clear that existing laws in the “creditor-friendly” jurisdictions cannot effectively protect poor countries from predatory creditor activity. The case of Donegal International Ltd v. Republic of Zambia & Another78provides a good illustration of the problem. In that case, the British High Court, while accepting that Zambia “is a poor country”, stressed that it was concerned with the “legal questions” raised by the applications before it and “not with questions of morality or humanity”.79 This underlines the need for Governments to 74 75 76 77 78 79 GE.10-13156 EMTA, “Submission” (see footnote 60), p. 16. See also submission of Dechert LLP, in United Kingdom, Ensuring Effective Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Consultation responses received (2010). Case of Sporrong and Lonnroth, judgement of 23 September 1982, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 52, para. 61. Centre for Economic and Social Rights, “Human rights and the global economic crisis: consequences, causes and responses” (2009), p. 5. “The Government believes it is in the interests of the UK and the world to tackle the many challenges of world poverty. In an increasingly interdependent world, international development is vital to global common interests that will profoundly affect the quality of life for all ….” (United Kingdom, Ensuring Effective Debt Relief (see footnote 44), p. 11). See sect. III, footnote 12. Ibid., para. 2. 19